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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## SPD'S VOGEL ON GENEVA TALKS, COUNTERARMAMENT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 13 Sep 83 p 12

[Vogel letter to the SPD Bundestag Faction: "The Decision Can Also Be Definitely in the Negative"]

[Text] In a letter to the "dear friends" of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group, the group's chief Hans-Jochen Vogel once again comprehensively explained the position taken by the SPD parliamentarians in view of the INF negotiations in Europe. In the letter, Vogel emphasizes his demand that the INF negotiations and the START talks (to reduce intercontinental nuclear missiles) should be merged in Geneva. Vogel continues to consider agreement in Geneva as possible but also does not exclude a clear "no" by his party to the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles. The text of an abridged version of Vogel's position paper is being published in the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU documentation section.

## I.

The question is increasingly of concern to our people whether by the end of this year stationing of the Pershing II missiles will start first on FRG territory only to be followed by the stationing of 464 Cruise Missiles, the latter not only in the FRG but also in Great Britain, The Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. The people feel that we are facing decisions of tremendous significance and they know that the time contemplated for these decisions is approaching. It is the time at which, according to the NATO dual-track decision, "NATO's INF need will be examined in light of concrete negotiating results." And the final round of negotiations, according to prior agreement, will take place in Geneva this fall.

It has not yet become clear whether, when, and how NATO will make this examination. Some announcements--including those of

the Federal Government--create the impression that automatism is to take place here; that is to say, if no agreement is reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conditionally planned stationing will be automatic and necessary without any further study.

The Social Democrats have opposed this view from the start. As early as the 1979 Berlin Party Congress that preceded the NATO dual-track decision, it is stated: "Therefore there must be no automatisms. The course of the negotiations and the expected results must enable the NATO politicians at all times to examine decisions and to revise them if necessary."

Accordingly, the Social Democrats at a special party congress in November 1983 will deal with the result of the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear weapons and finally determine their position on the stationing question. By the way, at its 1982 party congress in Berlin, the FDP also resolved as follows: "The FDP will examine at a federal party congress the concrete need for counterarming in light of the negotiating results achieved by then." For this purpose it does not need any special party congress only because its next regular party congress is anyhow scheduled for 18-20 November 1983 in Karlsruhe. However, CDU and CSU have decided in favor of automatism and therefore consider it unnecessary to have their party congresses deal with the Geneva outcome prior to the start of stationing.

It appears to be imperative that all political and social forces of our country once again conduct as sober an inventory as possible of their assessments, positions, and arguments prior to the start of this phase.

## II.

Such an inventory must start with the determination of what is actually at stake, what dangers we have to meet. In this effort, neither hysteria nor soothing words that gloss over things are appropriate.

First of all, what is at stake is whether the nuclear armament in Europe is spiraling once again or whether it is being stopped by an agreement of the superpowers. In other words, whether the stationing of the SS 20, of which the Soviet Union has deployed a total of about 350 systems since 1976, will continue (or will be continued with new short-range missiles) and NATO on its part will station 572 new systems--or whether this process can be stopped by negotiations and then reversed.

But these facts must not be viewed in isolation. The missiles in question are not the first nuclear weapons. It is rather the further stockpiling of destructive forces the extent of which even now exceeds every rational yardstick. In 1981, a study by the Papal Academy of Sciences, which the Pope had special delegations pass on to the heads of state of all nuclear states, succinctly stated: "The latest assertions that a war with nuclear weapons is winnable or that it is even survivable, indicate an inadequate assessment of the medical reality.... If a nuclear weapon with a one-million-ton warhead (the Hiroshima bomb had a warhead of about 15,000 tons) exploded in the center of the city, there would be destruction over a 180 square kilometer area, 250,000 dead, 500,000 seriously injured."

Cardinal Koenig of Vienna said that what people continue to call war was not war but total destruction. At the same time he pointed out that the destructive capacities stockpiled in Europe even now correspond to an equivalent of 3,000 kilograms of explosives per inhabitant. And Andrey Sakharov calculated, regardless of different conclusions, that the entire explosive force of all explosives used in World War II amounted to 6 megatons of TNT, while now 13,000 megatons are available, or more than 2,000-fold that megatonnage.

All that makes it evident that we have to deal here with a challenge of a completely new quality. We are the first generation in the history of mankind which has acquired the awful capability to exterminate not only individual armies, cities, and provinces or also peoples but also to completely destroy its own genus, yes every higher form of life on our planet. This is a danger that taxes man's power of imagination to extreme limits. And for this very reason it has taken roughly a quarter of a century until the existence and reality of this danger has penetrated man's consciousness.

Lately that has been challenged. It is being asserted that in earlier centuries, too, there had been comparable dangers. The 30-year war and the plague are then mentioned. But that is misleading. If further indicators of the uniqueness of this situation are required, they are available in large numbers. I am only mentioning the warning statements of the Christian churches: For example, the peace memorandum of the Protestant Church; the circular letters of the Catholic bishops in the United States, the GDR, and in the FRG; or the Pope's statements before the United Nations, in Hiroshima and before the UNESCO. The Catholic Church in particular is not inclined to comment rashly and on the basis of superficial impressions only.

Moreover, the churches have not been content with general statements. They have agreed on describing the strategy of



deterrence as morally barely tolerable for a limited time-- Cardinal Hoeffner even spoke of a reprieve--only if intensive efforts are being undertaken to replace it by less dangerous strategies and to achieve general disarmament. Moreover, the U.S. Catholic bishops have rejected first use of nuclear weapons because the danger of escalation is so great that it cannot be justified morally to trigger a nuclear war in any form. And the bishops' FRG colleagues in their text "Justice and Peace" have emphasized the sentence from the Vatican document "Gaudium et spes" (Pastoral constitution of the Second Vatican Council) according to which the use of nuclear weapons against population centers is not permitted under any circumstances. Important are also the three criteria which were developed in the text to assess nuclear armament measures:

"--Existing or planned military means must not make war more leadable or more probable.

"--Only such military means and so many are permitted to be provided as a minimum required for the purpose of deterrence oriented toward prevention of war.

"--All military means must be compatible with effective bilateral arms limitation, arms reduction, and disarmament."

The danger of total destruction of life is the worst consequence of the nuclear arms race, but not the only one. The economic and ecological consequences are also serious. A fraction of the sums spent for this race and the arms race of over \$700 billion in 1982 (SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1983), that is about DM 1.7 trillion, would suffice to significantly alleviate hunger and unemployment in the whole world. The Brandt Commission and the Nonaligned Nations Conference early March 1983 in New Delhi have especially impressively pointed out this interrelationship. The Nonaligned Nations Conference has also called attention to the danger of the destruction of the ecological balance as a result of the arms race. Raw materials and natural resources of our planet already in short supply are increasingly exploited for destructive purposes instead of being used for revival and restructuring of the world economy.

If the Geneva negotiations fail, then the Soviet Union very probably will resume the stationing of the SS 20 missiles and furthermore will start stationing shorter-range missiles in the GDR and in other neighboring Eastern countries. This would further increase the danger. Both sides will then be able to inflict blows against one another more quickly and more precisely, of which some believe that their predictable and limitable effect would make nuclear war in Europe possible or

even winnable. In final analysis, extension of the mutual threat to outer space is the logical outcome of the process.

The dangers mentioned here especially apply to the FRG and the GDR. For geographical reasons alone, the two German states would be transformed into a desert even with the slightest nuclear confrontation. Apart from that, the relations between the two German states would at any rate be put to a hard test. It is not accidental that the most urgent demands to end the arms race come especially from the GDR, namely from the legitimate spokesmen of the Protestant and Catholic Christians. They have good reasons to fear that a failure in Geneva will have the most concrete and most rapid consequences.

The view recently expressed by the Federal Government and disseminated in a campaign-like fashion by part of the media that the stationing will leave East-West and German-German relations untouched, everything will go on as before and that then concessions can be expected that were not previously made, does not find support in recognizable facts. This view in the first place serves the purpose of influencing the struggle for public opinion in the fall to the effect that there is no cause for protests or worries.

### III.

Starting point of the process whose critical phase we are now facing is the Soviet decision to modernize its intermediate range potential, that is to replace and supplement the SS 4 and SS 5 missiles by SS 20 missiles and the fact that the Soviet Union has continuously implemented this decision in recent years. In place of 600 warheads, with which we had lived for 20 years--not without worries--there are now roughly 1000 warheads. This action--not conclusively justifiable to date--burdens the Soviet Union with heavy responsibility.

Helmut Schmidt was one of the first to point out this development, but first hoped that the two superpowers would make limiting agreements also for this area as part of the then ongoing SALT negotiations. When this hope was not fulfilled, he took initiatives which finally led to the NATO dual-track decision. In doing so, his goal was to correct a development which he considered disastrous, namely the shifting of the nuclear race from the ICBM to the intermediate range missiles. What he wanted was not more missiles but limitations also in this field. The first part of the NATO decision was a means toward achieving this end. In this connection, Helmut Schmidt repeatedly pointed out the interdependence of the negotiations on the two areas. Helmut Schmidt has ver favored automatism.



Rather he underscored the necessity to determine the need for counterarming on our part by the end of 1983 and added that this need could also be zero.

Since especially the advocates of the toughest possible course in the FRG but also in the United States constantly refer to Helmut Schmidt, it is important to recall these circumstances.

It is just as important to recall additional facts under which the dual-track decision was made. The following facts are especially important because to many who approved of the decision at that time, they had the character of preconditions.

1. We started from the assumption that the SALT-II agreement will be ratified. Ratification was under way in the U.S. Senate. The NATO dual-track decision was regarded as necessary assistance to overcome the resistance to ratification that appeared in the U.S. Senate. However, SALT II ratification failed in the United States.

2. The SALT II agreement provided for negotiations on a third agreement. The NATO dual-track decision therefore provides that negotiations on intermediate-range weapons were also to be carried on as part of SALT III.

3. The detente policy was uncontested; its function as one of the two bases of the NATO alliance according to the Harmel report was not controversial. Nobody was saying that limited nuclear wars could be carried on in Europe and also could be won. Nobody was saying that the Soviet Union had to be brought to its knees and that it represented the empire of evil. And no responsible politician in the world demanded that crises in other parts of the world must possibly be met by "horizontal escalation."

Moreover, nobody considered it possible at that time that members of the Federal Government would again put the Oder/Neisse border on the political agenda.

4. Furthermore, a role was also played by the fact that making available ports required for a sea-basing of Cruise Missiles appeared to be unattainable and was also called technically impossible.

#### IV.

The NATO dual-track decision brought about the resumption of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediate-range missiles in Geneva in November 1981. But Helmut Schmidt made a further

essential contribution in overcoming first the Soviet resistance to such negotiations and then the hesitation of the new U.S. administration, which, at first, showed little inclination to negotiate in Geneva.

During the negotiations in Geneva, both sides have moved. The United States has moved from the zero option proposal, which wanted to respond to a complete Soviet renunciation of land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe--in the entire Soviet Union and not only in its Western part--with the renunciation of the stationing of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The United States stated that it was ready to deploy only as many systems as the Soviet Union intended to maintain. If the Soviet Union reduced the number of its systems, then the extent of the U.S. deployment would also be reduced, in the ideal situation even to zero.

#### SPD Party Congress Favored Taking Into Account European Systems

The Soviet Union on its part offered a reduction to 162 systems if NATO abandons stationing of missiles. Thus, the Soviet Union justified its offer, it would have only the number of systems aimed at it by Great Britain and France. Later on it also expressed its readiness to negotiate on an equal number of warheads instead of an equal number of systems. The meaning of the term "reduction" at first was not clear. In the meantime, General Secretary Andropov explained that reduction meant scrapping.

Further progression, yes even agreement appeared possible during the summer of 1982. At that time, the two delegation chiefs, Nitze and Kvitsinkiy, personally and without any obligations for their governments prepared a model that envisaged the following elements for an agreement:

1. Limitation of the land-based INF potential on both sides to 75 systems each with a total of 300 and 225 warheads, respectively: that is to say, on 75 launchers for cruise missiles with a total of four missiles each with one warhead each on the Western side, and 75 SS 20 missiles with three warheads each in the European part of the Soviet Union.
2. The Soviet Union can deploy an additional 90 SS 20 in the Asiatic part.
3. Limitation of the number of aircraft on both sides with nuclear capability in the INF area to 150 each.
4. The British and French systems will not be included.

Both governments rejected this model in the fall of 1982. There was no consultation within NATO prior to the rejection by the U.S. administration. Federal Chancellor Kohl was informed of the event in October 1982 but--for whatever reasons--remained completely passive and it was not until the summer of 1983 that he pursued the idea halfheartedly.

According to the present status of the negotiations, the existence of the so-called third-country systems constitutes a central problem. What is involved are in France 18 land-based, 80 submarine-based and about 40 aircraft-based systems (Mirage aircraft). Great Britain possesses 64 submarine-based and a total of more than 50 aircraft-based systems with one warhead each according to SALT criteria. Both states have announced in the meantime (since 1981) sizable modernization and expansion programs and partially put them into effect. Accordingly, by 1990/95 both countries will have roughly 1500 nuclear warheads.

The Foreign Office has repeatedly stated in public that the 144 British and French submarine-based systems and the 20 submarine based systems of the Soviet Baltic Fleet are part of the nuclear intermediate range potential and are not included in the SALT II agreement. The same must apply to the 18 land-based French systems. All sea- and aircraft-based systems, including the land-based systems of the French and British, are listed in the 1979 Defense White Book as intermediate-range systems "in and for Europe."

It is not easy to see how we can justify the demand that we can act in the INF negotiations in Geneva as if the submarine- and land-based French systems that we ourselves classified as intermediate range potential not included in SALT II did not exist at all. A short time ago, Richard Loewenthal called the demand for counting these systems as the strongest Soviet argument. The 1982 SPD Party Congress in Munich favored taking them into account. The Nitze-Kvitsinkiy model takes their existence into account by NATO's unspoken renunciation of Pershing II deployment.

## V.

Are there still prospects for agreement in Geneva? There is considerable divergence of opinions. On the one hand, it is said that would be tantamount to a miracle. On the other hand, there are cautiously optimistic statements. In final analysis, it all depends on the willingness to agree and compromise of the negotiating partners. A multitude of factors shape the formation of this willingness. The results can only be somewhat estimated toward the end of the round of negotiations which are

starting on 6 September. The Federal Republic is not a negotiating partner. Therefore it cannot achieve agreement. But it can have influence on the willingness for agreement, just as it had a positive effect on the willingness to negotiate of the superpowers during Helmut Schmidt's chancellorship.

Such possibilities for agreement do exist.

A promising compromise could, for example, include the following elements:

1. The INF negotiations are combined with the START negotiations (on intercontinental missile systems--the editors).
2. In the combined negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States commit themselves also to strive for a limitation of all land-, air-, and sea-based intermediate range nuclear systems.
3. On the occasion of the combining of the negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union exchange declarations of intention stating that the Soviet Union will drastically reduce the number of its land-based intermediate range missile systems by scrapping and that the United States will appropriately take into account the third-country systems as part of the overall negotiations; remaining differences in the Eurostrategic area will be balanced in the overall strategic area. Thus a result seems to be attainable that obviates the need for deployment of new U.S. intermediate range systems in Europe.
4. The United States and the Soviet Union agree on a stationing and modernization freeze for their short-range missiles in Europe.

The U.S. House of Representatives, as is known, has also come out in favor of such a combination of INF and START negotiations with a two-thirds majority. As already shown, the combination follows the general line of the deliberations which led to the NATO dual-track decision and have found expression in it. "Via limitations of U.S. and Soviet LRTNF ('Long Range Theater Nuclear Force'; now called 'Intermediate Range Nuclear Force' (INF)--The editors), bilateral negotiations are to be carried on step by step within the framework of SALT III." (Clause 9 b of the Communiqué of the 12 December 1979 Special Session of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers.)

Another possibility would be to take up again the Nitze-Kvitsinskiy model and to agree to this model after all, possibly with some modifications. Such an agreement could be

supplemented by the binding declaration of intention of both sides to seek agreement on specifically taking into account the third-country systems within the framework of the START negotiations.

Regardless of the concrete contents of such options, it appears absolutely unacceptable that in a question of such importance there should not also be a meeting of foreign ministers and, in final analysis, of the two responsible chiefs of state. After all, such meetings have taken place in the past in instances of much less importance.

All possibilities mentioned here assume further movement on both sides and also and especially from the U.S. side. It is the duty of the Federal Government to exert its influence toward such movement. The SPD as opposition has done so with its motion of 15 June 1983 and will continue to do so. The following considerations are of importance in this connection:

1. We should appreciate the political power of a superpower not only by its military aspects. Economic potential, acceptance of its domestic order by its citizens and their agreement with the goals pursued by the state leadership as well as the ability for peaceful change of domestic structures and political goals are just as important. And if a country's ability to defend itself is guaranteed, the above factors are even more important than superiority that can be calculated like the masses of available explosive force in megatons.

2. Therefore, it must also be weighed whether the things that would add to NATO's political power under the prevailing conditions by the deployment of intermediate range missiles would not be destroyed to a degree that at the end there would not be a strengthening but a political weakening of the alliance through the loss of acceptance and through the deep rifts which the dispute on the stationing has already caused in our people--and not only in our people--and will continue to cause.

3. In this connection the fact is important that, according to the opinion polls, an absolute majority constantly rejects stationing and nearly a three-quarters majority advocates preferably additional negotiations than additional armament and this regardless of the fact that the preponderant majority of the people, just as the SPD, advocates active FRG membership in NATO.

The considerations presented by me have nothing to do with our membership in the alliance and nothing at all to do with being anti-American. On the contrary. All worries, doubts, and



reflections are being discussed in the United States in just as lively a manner as here with us, in fact some of them have first been formulated in the United States.

#### VI.

If an agreement is reached in Geneva, the SPD will carefully assess its elements. An agreement in the above-developed framework at any rate would reach the goal desired by the SPD to include the intermediate range nuclear systems at long last in the arms control agreements. Moreover, the SPD is aware that compromises cannot fulfill all wishes.

If there is no agreement in Geneva, then the SPD will make a decision according to its election program. In doing so, the change in the political environment will play a part. Furthermore, it will be important that the Geneva negotiations, for which 4 years had been planned in 1979, in fact did not start until November 1981. Added to that, if the United States does not show adequate flexibility in Geneva, then the decision can also be definitely "no."

The decision of the federal party congress is being prepared as is the practice in a democratic party. Some districts have already adopted resolutions at their party congresses. The others will follow. These decisions are being made according to the situation at the moment. In the conferences and resolutions it is evident that the "no" of not a few delegates to counterarming and stationing depends not only on the course of the Geneva negotiations but they see it as a matter of principle.

Such a view has already been advocated at the federal party congresses in Berlin in 1979 and in Munich in 1982, however was not shared, but respected, by the majorities at the time. But the Social Democrats who so vote also know that the struggle of the SPD for peace, security, and detente must continue also after the fall of 1983.

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## AUTONOMOUS GROUPS ON FRINGE OF PEACE MOVEMENT

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 26 Sep 83 pp 35-43

[Article on the Autonomous, the militant offshoot of the peace movement:  
"'All or Nothing--Who Cares, But Away With It'"]

[Text] With Marx and Mao they have little in common. Leftist Alternatives and ecologically oriented Greens are just as suspect to them as all those who engage in peaceful demonstrations for peace.

They oppose new missiles and any kind of armament. They are fighting against nuclear power plants, capitalists and, in fact, any kind of people in power.

They want to establish "structures of resistance against the economic and political system" and make propaganda for change through "permanent revolution" or "permanent revolt"--they do not really care exactly which. What they would like best is constantly to unhinge the "whole disgusting system."

In their own estimation many of them have a "'diffuse kind of anarchism' in mind"; yet they do not want to be "traditional anarchists." They are the supporters of a new West German protest movement calling itself "autonomous" and preferably operating in a militant way.

According to personnel of the VfS [Office for the Protection of the Constitution], about 700 West German "autonomous groups" have mobilized "several thousand predominantly young people" assembled "in diffuse combinations which often resemble hordes." Their protest is directed against missile armament, which they want to prevent by hook or by crook.

They make propaganda for "direct actions" against counterarming and NATO and are planning to put obstacles in the way of munition transports and to occupy military installations. Peaceful blockades, such as those at Mutlangen in early September, they find far too wishy-washy. They want to penetrate the precincts of Bonn, surround a barracks in Bremerhaven (headquarters of the U.S. Military Sealift Command) and blockade the port installations of Bremerhaven/Nordenham, transshipment point for arms replenishment of the U.S. Armed Forces.



"There is something brewing there which may become dangerous," says a West German Vfs man. The Vfs in Lower Saxony even fears that "another variant of terrorism" in addition to the RAF [Red Army Faction] and the RZ [Revolutionary Cells] "might be unfolding."

Autonomous groups have shown for more than 3 years what they are able and willing to do:

On 6 May 1980, on the occasion of the administering of the oath to recruits, they engaged in a big street battle with the police in front of the Weser Stadium in Bremen. Some hundreds of them from Bremen, Hamburg and North Rhine-Westphalia placed themselves at the head of a demonstration parade, pelting police with stones and setting police vehicles on fire.

On 11 June 1982, when U.S. President Ronald Reagan came to West Berlin, and on 25 June 1983, when U.S. Vice President George Bush visited Krefeld, masked members of the autonomous groups attacked police officers with stones and sticks.

Members of the autonomous groups also mingled among demonstrators and incited to violence during the protest against West Runway at the Frankfurt airport, in front of the Konrad Shaft nuclear waste disposal site at Salzgitter and during the evacuation of occupied housing in Berlin.

The term "autonomous," borrowed from Italian and French models, meanwhile has been used by groups from the ecological and squatter's scene and from the peace and women's movement, many of which want to make things very hot for the establishment in the autumn and also thereafter--preferably the following way: "Go there, put on helmets, make a racket, leave."

The militant minigroups have long since become a domestic political factor. Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann, CSU, and his parliamentary state secretary, Carl-Dieter Spranger, are using the small radical minority in the broad spectrum of the missile opponents to bring the entire peace movement into disrepute. According to Spranger's capsule analysis, the new extraparliamentary opposition is definitely "more dangerous" and "laid out on a larger scale" than the APO [Extraparliamentary Opposition] of 1968. Zimmermann also bases his political demands for drastically tightening the law governing demonstrations and punishing the masking of demonstrators by pointing to the autonomous groups.

Actually the riotous groups, which attack the state and its guardians with helmet and mask and sticks and stones do not even constitute 1 percent of the peace movement, and their actions meet with little response there. During protest marches they are quite often held back by peaceful demonstrators, and in Mutlangen they were not allowed to participate at first.

Internally the militant protestors are engaged in bitter quarrels concerning orientation--Sponti groups with streetfighters, anti nuclear groups with Knast [jail] groups. The varied hard core, which makes itself heard with

nonsense slogans ("all or nothing--who cares, but away with it") and slogans of violence ("all of society must be smashed"), which coordinates actions in scene hangouts and communicates via alternative and underground papers is papers, is divided primarily into two camps:

The Autonomous groups, organized in about 45 West German towns, including Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Bremen and Freiburg. Their fighters maintain only loose contact and do not have any common ideology or any firm structures or leaders. "Autonomous cells" take credit for acts of sabotage and bomb attacks, and Vfs personnel consider part of the autonomous groups to be close to the terrorist RZ [Revolutionary Cells].

The Anti-imperialists ("Antiimpis")--a few hundred activists distributed over 17 West German towns. They combine militant actions and attacks with political agitation. There is a predominance of women, many members are college graduates, and 90 percent of the members are said to be known to the police and to have a record. In part they are oriented ideologically and organizationally toward the RAF, with Vfs personnel regarding them as "a kind of RAF assembly line in public."

According to experts of the scene, the Autonomous together with Anti-imperialists represent "generally the militant part of the activists, operating within the framework of the so-called small-group strategy." The small groups battle with the police "wherever they are superior, but retreat wherever they are inferior."

A common plan as to just where and when the conflict is to be sought this fall does not exist as yet. The groups are still consulting, and as yet only the slogan has been decided on: "Direct confrontation with those in power" instead of "wishy-washy demos" or "deescalation talks with the fuzz." Another thing that is clear is the objective "autonomy, and pronto."

Thus an Autonomous thesis printed by a paper of the Berlin scene, RADIKAL, states: "We want to...destroy...the state." The movement, it says, is fighting "not for ideologies" or "for the proletariat or the people but for a self-determined life in all spheres."

What things might then look like was outlined by the Hamburg Political Ecology Working Committee. An excerpt

"Striving for autonomy means, above all, fighting against political and moral alienation from life and work.... This striving is manifested when housing is occupied so that one can live in human dignity and ceases paying high rents, when workers call in sick because they can no longer stand others having the say at the place of work, when unemployed loot supermarkets to procure the necessary clothes and food."

As papers of the scene put it, "unsuccessful Alternatives, Studies [students], Jobbers and anarchist-Sponti elements" seek to drop out with a wholly negative attitude toward society and a lot of fantasies about the future in their heads, seek to march into a land whose borders are called dream and terror--which are crossed loosely by some.

The question they put to themselves as to "what in fact is an autonomous person" was answered by the anonymous authors of a brochure "Guerilla diffusa--in Bewegung bleiben" [Diffuse Guerrilla--Keep Moving] published a couple of years ago by a "Verlag letzte Runde" [Final-Round Publishing House]:

"Perhaps a former communist group activist, perhaps a woman moved to stand up for her rights, perhaps both or neither. There are probably quite a few anarchists of all factions. Drug addicts, dreamers, covert gays and prattlers. Punks, and even more so would-be Punks. Nor can one say anything really definite about our age. Officially we are young people, which of course goes down as smoothly as honey."

What the Autonomous and Anti-imperialists represent and, if possible, perpetrate is expounded and discussed in sizable strategy papers, anonymous theoretical brochures and numerous papers of the scene.

Publications in which "the bottom line and perspectives of resistance" (the title of a book) are pointed up, or in which--such as in "Zoff," "Vitamino" or "Ramba Zamba"--terrorist attacks are encouraged to boot, call for "practical resistance" and violation of the law "en masse."

Meant primarily for internal communication are publications such as RADIKAL of Berlin, GROSSE FREIHEIT of Hamburg, the Stuttgart BLAETTLE and the Oldenburg NORDWIND, which occasionally have published letters by terrorist groups claiming credit for terrorist actions--prompting prosecution of the publishers for "promoting a terrorist organization."

In the alternative TAGESZEITUNG ("TAZ") too, particularly in the letters-to-the-editor columns, members of autonomous groups anonymously make their views known. An "Anton Anonymous" or an "Otto Graf Resistance" propose nationwide street and railroad track blockades on a certain day in autumn or a "Bruno Brutal" and "Captain Future" argue about the rocky road to the freedom they have in mind--a downright inexhaustible subject among the Autonomous.

"Perhaps," states an Autonomous theory in RADIKAL, "freedom is but the brief moment when one grabs the cobblestone until the moment when it hits--i.e., the moment of change, of crossing the border, of movement."

The program of the autonomous groups is characterized by purposive actionism [Aktionismus] (the slogan: "Legal, illegal, who gives a shit"), by propaganda of action ("Just as important as action is its communication") and by the demand for spontaneous "variety rather than simplemindedness" [a play on words in German] in the fight against a world of enemies. In the words of RADIKAL, "violence or nonviolence, militancy or cleverness do not confront each other as alternatives but have to complement each other."

These guidelines resemble concepts which emerged in the antiauthoritarian movement of the late sixties. If in those days it was a question of changing the existing social order and overcoming it in order allegedly to create a better state, now the Autonomous objective is a society completely devoid of

rule. The adversary now is not only the bourgeois, technocratic state, but Marxism, socialism and communism are rejected as well. And in contrast with the Maoist-oriented communist groups of the seventies, which saw to strict party discipline with special regulations and rituals, the new militants reject dogmas of any kind of political orientation.

The "self-organization" of the individual, one's own person, is the center of all action--guided more often by one's gut feeling than by one's head. "This movement," in the opinion of a North German Office of the Interior evaluating what in fact can be termed a morbid egocentricity, "has downright autistic characteristics."

The drift into Autonomy was furthered by a disappointing experience in the citizens' initiative movement, particularly in the fight against nuclear plants such as Wyhl and Brokdorf or in the evacuation of housing occupied by squatters. Supporters of the North German Lower Elbe Environmental Protection Citizens' Initiative, the Goettingen Working Committee Against Nuclear Plants or the Berlin squatters scene are becoming radicalized--getting away from their single-issue objectives.

Now it is a question of opposing whatever restricts one's elbowroom, extending to "a diffuse guerrilla force of autonomous and revolutionary cells," as RADIKAL puts it, "in order to attack the state wherever it happens to be vulnerable."

Because it is orderly job activity above all which stands in the way of one's ideal of freedom, Autonomous propaganda talks about a "right to laziness." "We don't give a damn about work," states a "Workers Autonomy" in the Oldenburg NORDWIND, for "work is violence." Autonomous groups in the Ruhr want "unemployment for all, with full unemployment compensation."

To demonstrate what is considered practicable, "dropouts who do not want to work, Chaoten (chaotics), squatters and traveling professional revolutionaries" are supplied with practical advice:

"In practical terms, that means to swipe a little BAFOeG [Federal Law for the Advancement of Education] money or unemployment compensation (conscious appropriation of public funds does not mean basic recognition of the state; it is simply theft in the computer age) or to filch a bit of fruit from Kaisers, [a West German supermarket chain] to stop paying rent, commit a small insurance fraud each year (it does not always have to be the banks, after all), not to be so prone to accept compensation, as billboards everywhere are shouting that we should, to live together in sizable groups, to form communes and gangs--and, if worse comes to worst, to work a few days."

The radical dropouts hope for concentration and strengthening of their surroundings through specific actions in or with the peace movement, be it in planned blockades of munition transports or in occupations of companies or military installations.



"It is the chance and possibility of our further resistance," states a leaflet of "Autonomous plus Anti-imperialist groups," "jointly with the guerrillas and the continual militant resistance to promote the break--against the FRG State, against the U.S./NATO military strategy."

While peaceful missile opponents are ridiculed and criticized because of their nonviolent resistance, the militants demand from the "leftist Liberallallas [sic]" (Autonomous paper GROSSE FREIHEIT) that they be tolerant toward their violent forms of protest.

Meanwhile the police attribute numerous attacks in West Berlin and the Federal Republic to the Autonomous and Anti-imperialists. Molotov cocktails and homemade bombs of the "Guerilla diffusa" hit department stores and banks, courthouses and city halls; construction machinery and power installations were destroyed, and occasionally there were attacks on judges and electricity company managers at home. There were also attacks against civilian and military installations of the Americans, the declared principal enemies of the movement.

"This circle of missile opponents," West German security experts worry, "constitutes a certain unpredictability for us this fall."

8790

CSO: 3620/10

## TOP GRAPO FIGURES ARRESTED IN BARCELONA

Madrid ABC in Spanish 22 Sep 83 p 26

[Text] Barcelona (Efe)--Josefina Garcia Aramburu, at present the top leader of the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Group], was arrested last weekend, along with her husband Joaquin Calero Arcones, who was in charge of the information and propaganda apparatus of that terrorist organization. Both "grapos" were carrying a pistol at the time of their capture. As a result of these arrests three "safe" apartments were discovered in the Sans district and in the Hospitalet and Calella areas. In these apartments were found two automatic weapons, three pistols, two shotguns, a rifle, 10 cases of explosives, detonators, a machine for manufacturing identity papers, false and blank documents, as well as a large quantity of 9mm Parabellum ammunition.

The operation, which was carried out by officials of the Regional Information Squad, was the result of patient investigation and discreet "sweeps" carried out in Barcelona neighborhoods.

Josefina Garcia Aramburu, age 31, became the top leader of the GRAPO on the death of Martin Luna. She was joined in this task by Jose Balmon Castell when he was released from prison after carrying out his sentence. It is believed that this individual is the one who will now lead the organization, which is already much reduced in size.

Joaquin Calero Arcones, age 34, a draftsman, was in charge of the propaganda apparatus of the PCR [Revolutionary Communist Party]-GRAPO, which puts out the publication GACETA ROJA and BANDERA ROJA. He was first arrested in July 1976. He is the brother of another GRAPO member, Raul, who died in 1979 beside his wife in a confrontation with the Civil Guard.

These arrests follow those of Anastasio Gonzalez Cardiel and Maria del Carmen Munoz Martinez on 24 August, also in Barcelona, and those of Gonzalez Cambeiro and Maria del Carmen Cayetano on the 12th of this month in La Coruna. According to police sources, only six terrorists from this group remain at large: Jose Balmon, Antonio Pedrero Donoso, Milagros Cabellero, Mercedes Padros Corominas, Maria Teresa de Jesus and Maria Rosa Lopez Milan.

The appeals court of Versailles (southwest of Paris) has allowed the extradition of Juan Domingo Martinez Lorenzo, an extreme rightist in ideology, who is accused of complicity in the murder of a member of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] in Madrid, which occurred on 6 May 1980.

## BARRIONUEVO ON JUDICIAL, SECURITY, C.A. IMPACT OF ETA

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 13

[Text] Madrid--The minister of the interior, Jose Barrionuevo, hopes that the day will come when judges and prosecutors will "stop acting solely on the basis of paperwork," and will be prepared to face the true and immediate reality of crime, as he told a group of journalists yesterday. The minister added that "the heart of the problem is the lack of means of administering justice." Barrionuevo also asserted that from now he will "personally and directly" take over the struggle against terrorism, EFE reports.

"The peak of the insecurity due to the releases from prison" has already passed, according to Barrionuevo, who said that he agreed with the reform of the Penal Code. The head of the Ministry of the Interior believes that the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] at present "does not have much money. The members in France are living under precarious conditions. They have financial problems because the circle is becoming smaller, and they have not taken action for some time. According to our calculations, it is possible that they are planning another kidnapping," but "there is no ETA commando group in Madrid."

There are four objectives in the antiterrorist struggle: to have all security personnel in the Basque Country be volunteers; to cut off the flow of economic aid to the ETA; to improve relations with France; and to have better coordination of information. At times the ETA prevents the return of repentant ETA members. This was the case with Ochotorena, who died in Paris of leukemia. "He asked to be allowed to return so as to pass his final days with his family, but the ETA prevented him from doing it. I had already personally authorized his return to Spain."

The minister believes that the topic of the presence of ETA members in Costa Rica and Nicaragua has been exaggerated. There is no information about ETA training camps in the latter country, although "it is true that there are people there from the ETA and parties of the extreme Left, just as there are in Mexico or Venezuela." All in all, the information provided about "El Pistolas" is "very promising."

8131

CSO: 3548/7



## ETA JIMENEZ CASE LOSES STEAM FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 15

[Article by Jesus Ceberio, special correspondent]

[Text] San Jose de Costa Rica--The Costa Rican minister of security, Angel Edmundo Solano, told this correspondent yesterday that political statements had been made which "perhaps were not advisable" about the arrest in San Jose of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] member Gregorio Jimenez Morales, alias "El Pistolas." The minister added that "political factors have weighed more heavily than the legal ones."

It has been 2 weeks since the subject arose, and now that it has passed into the judicial sphere, the feeling is growing that the depth charge which was fired against the Sandinist government is beginning to fizzle out because of lack of evidence. Yesterday for the first time the newspapers relegated the topic to their inside pages.

Only if new arrests of other ETA members should occur, something which is quite unlikely, given the amount of time which has passed, would it be possible to sustain the additional charge of illicit association before the judge. The minister stated that the whole case has rested on two points: the information provided by the Spanish police concerning previous activities of Jimenez Morales; and "the statements which the accused initially made to the office of Intelligence and Security (DIS) which he later did not sustain on the advice of his attorney."

There is controversy about the statement made to the police by the ETA member. Before his return to Spain, the Basque deputy from Herri Batasuna [Popular Unity], Miguel Castells, insisted that Jimenez Morales had not signed any confession other than the one he made relating to the use of false documents. "He did not make a declaration or did he sign any paper in which he admitted that he had been sent by the ETA or by the Sandinist government, or that the ETA maintained relations with Nicaraguan authorities or organizations."

Angel Edmundo Solano contradicts this version of events. "I had his statements in front of me, and they were signed by him. I set everything in motion starting from that basis. What happened is that in the Costa Rican judicial system what a prisoner says does not have any value as evidence unless he is

in the presence of his attorney or before a judge. His defense counsel recommended to him that he not admit anything that he said. And in his case I would have done the same. Now it is up to the DIA whether or not they can support the initial charges."

The minister of security admits that throughout the whole case "political factors have weighed more heavily than legal ones."

Over and beyond the consequences that the events are going to bring about on the Central American scene, the statements which the president of the Spanish Government, Felipe Gonzalez, made at the end of his meetings with commander Borge, exonerating the Sandinists of any links with the ETA, have caused serious concern in Costa Rica. President Luis Alberto Monge believes that it is obvious that Gonzalez has sided with Managua.

During a press conference which was held on Sunday in the southern part of Nicaragua by the anti-Sandinist leader Eden Pastora, the latter expressed his doubts that the head of the Spanish Government could have made any statements which so emphatically exonerated the Sandinists. "I am extremely sorry about it if it is true," he added. He said that evidence was lacking about the facts of any relationship between the ETA and the Sandinist government, although on one occasion while he was vice minister of defense he witnessed a meeting between two ETA members and commander Bayardo Arce.

8131

CSO: 3548/7

## EMIGRANTS' REMITTANCES TO PORTUGAL UP THIS YEAR

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 20 Sep 83 p 10

[Text] The remittances in escudos from Portuguese emigrants were up about 20 percent in the first quarter of this year as compared to the same period last year.

According to information supplied by the Bank of Portugal, such remittances totaled 48,180,000,000 contos, while the total for the first quarter of last year came to 40,149,000,000.

An analysis of these same remittances converted into dollars, however, shows that there was a reduction of 11 percent, a value which fails to reflect the real flow of foreign exchange resulting from emigration. This is due to the fact that a large part of the remittances are expressed in French francs and other European currencies which themselves have lost value in relation to the dollar. This means that the decline of 11 percent in dollars seen in these remittances does not represent a real decline in the volume of original currencies.

In any case, it can be seen that a slight decline was reported, difficult to assess overall, in the amounts sent back by Portuguese emigrants in foreign currencies.

This modification, moreover, confirms the belief that the remittance "gold mine" is beginning gradually to be exhausted, due to the return of a large number of the emigrants, or again the definite settlement of a certain number of them in the countries in which they are working, while there has been no counterbalancing migratory trend in recent years.

Of the total remittances sent by emigrants in the first quarter of this year, 31,299,000,000 contos came from the European member nations of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], 8,514,000,000 contos from the United States and Canada, and 8,367,000,000 contos from other parts of the world.

It was the month of January which provided the largest remittance total during the first quarter, with 17,104,000,000 contos.

Emigrants' remittances sent to the autonomous region of Madeira totaled 2,770,800 contos in the first quarter of this year, up 48.76 percent over the comparable period in 1982.

The European member nations of the OECD contributed only 298,700 contos (10.7 percent) to the total remittances sent to Madeira, as compared to 614,700 contos from the United States and Canada, and 1,864,400 contos from the rest of the world, which therefore accounted for 67.11 percent of the remittances to Madeira.

With regard to the Azores, emigrants' remittances totaled 790,300 contos in the first quarter of the year, as compared to 474,100 in the comparable period in 1982, thus showing an increase of 66.69 percent.

The United States and Canada were the source of almost all the remittances sent to the Azores, with a total of 780,700 contos, representing 98.78 percent of the total.

#### Tourist Income Up

Tourist income for the first quarter of this year totaled 13,049,000,000 contos, according to figures again published by the Bank of Portugal.

This income represented an increase of 37.45 percent over the total for the first 3 months of last year, a percentage substantially in excess of the devaluation of the escudo which occurred since then.

The United States represented the major source of tourist income in the first 3 months of the year, with a total of 4,394,000,000 contos, followed by the United Kingdom, with 2,334,000,000 contos, France with 1,455,000,000 contos and the FRG with 1,376,000,000 contos.

The month of March yielded the most income during the first quarter, with a total of 4,855,000,000 contos.

5157

CSO: 3542/2

## FUTURE PROBLEMS FORESEEN FOR SETENAVE SHIPYARD

## Gradual Deactivation Steps

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Sep 83 p 1

[Text] The SETENAVE will be gradually deactivated, while remaining on an operational basis, according to the decisions of the Council of Ministers published yesterday in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA.

The measures adopted take into account the low current competitive capacity of the enterprise, on the one hand, and the desirability of keeping the operational capacity of the shipyard available, on the other, since "it may in the future play an important role" in the "reequipping of the national merchant fleet" or in the event of a favorable development of the international market.

The Board of Directors of the SETENAVE will therefore undertake the "rationalization of the structure and volume of employees," and, working with the sponsoring ministries and the Ministry of Labor, it will define "the substitute system of labor relations in terms of the legislation in effect." These tasks are to be completed within the 30 days after the publication of the resolution.

Meanwhile, the Board of Directors is forbidden to accept, without the prior authorization of the sponsoring minister, "orders involving additional financial effort on the part of the state."

The allocations to the workers who are dismissed for which the law provides will be obtained from the Unemployment Fund, and the workers will retain priority rights to any job offers made in the future.

With regard to the completion of the three grain vessels currently under construction for the CNN, provision is made for the granting of a state guarantee for the domestic and foreign credit operations required, "in amounts and under conditions to be established by autonomous resolution."

The portion of the cost of these vessels which is not covered by the sale price to the ship's outfitter will be compensated by means of a nonreimbursible subsidy "to be used in accordance with the status of the construction work."

## Difficulties Analyzed

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 3 Sep 83 p 15

[Article by Augusto de Carvalho]

[Text] SETENAVE is scheduled to celebrate the eighth anniversary of the decree which nationalized it at precisely the moment when about 2,000 of its workers will receive notices of dismissal or suspension. These have been 8 years of acute crisis (dating in fact further back) because of various factors, the foremost involving the grandiose but excessive dream of which it was born. This was the same dream which gave birth to the gigantism of the SINES--the dream of oil tankers which, as is publicly known, no one wants today because they are too expensive and practically useless. We have the example of the much-vaunted S-106 to attest to this, with the international courts called upon to settle the dispute between the SETENAVE and the ship's outfitter who ordered the super oil tanker (see the review section of EXPRESSO, 6 Aug 1983, p 14).

However, the SETENAVE does not merit the fate of being scrapped, as some have sought to suggest, perhaps even with other intentions, which it is not our task to dissect here. This is one of the largest naval construction yards in the world, built on a scale equal to the large units now in disuse. It is one of the most modern as well, finer in quality than the majority of its counterparts anywhere in the world.

### Priority for Production

Vasco Goncalves, the prime minister under whose aegis the enterprise was nationalized, participated in the general meeting held Thursday to commemorate that nationalization. Vasco Goncalves said, in his romantic way, that "there is a joint effort by management and the government, which is now the heir to the AD [Democratic Alliance], to inculcate the idea in the minds of the workers that in the end it will be better to have the dismissal law, the notorious 'layoff' provision, because this way they will at least be paid two-thirds of their wages."

However, where the present government personnel is concerned, the SETENAVE case has been one of the most controversial. There is no doubt that it is generally agreed there will be suspensions, but how many is not known for certain.

A ministerial source told EXPRESSO that the plans for SETENAVE had called for 9,000 workers, distributed as follows: 6,000 for production and three for indirect, administrative, office and other service jobs. In very Portuguese fashion, however, only 3,000 were hired for production and 3,000 were added to the indirect category.

It seems to be the intention of the government, working through the ministry, to maintain the posts directly involved in production, such that the dismissals will occur in the other sector, which will not be allowed to retain more than 1,000 workers.



The statement issued day before yesterday by the Council of Ministers already referred by indirection to the problem of unemployment at the SETENAVE when it mentioned the measure in paragraph B: "Establishment by the Ministries of Labor and Social Security and Welfare, working with the managing board, of the substitute system of labor relations within the enterprise, within a period of 30 days."

And, in the following paragraph: "The guarantee of the allocations for the which the law provides for the workers who will be dismissed, and who will enjoy priority in the hiring which may be undertaken in the event of an increase in the productive capacity of the shipyard." The Council of Ministers' statement makes mention several times of the negotiations in which the management board is involved, but EXPRESSO has information suggesting that this board may be replaced within the course of the coming months.

#### Saving What Can Be Saved

SETENAVE, which was declared in economic difficulties in 1980, a situation now confirmed by the Council of Ministers, has also seen its problems aggravated not only by objective factors difficult to alter, but also because its redimensioning comes within the polemic discussion about the public enterprises, with all of the weight this has among us, reflected even on the level of the Council of Ministers itself. Be that as it may, it is the unanimous view of the Executive Branch that the situation, as it has developed, cannot continue, except at the risk of having to turn all of the workers into the street. Therefore, it is preferable to save what can be saved rather than letting it all go to ruin. And here two different priorities, although both lie along the same lines, emerge. One is the approach of the Ministry of Finance and the other that of the Ministry of Industry and Energy.

The Ministry of Finance (and not in this case alone) wants to maintain rigid control of all of the investments of the other departments, and it defends the need to pursue the least costly solutions. If it is cheaper (and this in an economy in ruins as ours is) to dismiss workers and make payment through the Unemployment Fund, then let the dismissals proceed. In support of its view, it cites the solutions adopted in other countries, although, where we are concerned, without sufficient attention to the social fabric involved. For example, countries like France, the United States or England are more easily able to absorb such disruptions in the labor sector, given their aid systems, which are not comparable to ours. However, the last statement from the Council of Ministers, to which we have been referring, also reflects the attitude of Ernani Lopes, particularly where SETENAVE is concerned. We were told this by an individual very close to him.

#### Veiga Simao

The Ministry of Industry, for its part, has been waging a battle for making SETENAVE viable, as operational as possible, which has already earned Veiga Simao the reputation of being the defender of nationalized enterprises, to a certain extent justified, while the communist left, for its part, never ceases to accuse him of conspiring to destroy the enterprise, recalling the fact that he was Marcelo Caetano's minister.



In this connection, a source at the Ministry of Industry told EXPRESSO: "We encourage private initiative. The fact is, however, that there are public enterprises under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Industry and Energy. It is our obligation to see that they function as well as we can and as well as we know how, consistent with the national interests. We are only implementing the law."

These statements also indicate to us the business philosophy of that ministry, very clear in the SETENAVE case, on the one hand, and in the Messa case, on the other.

This is a typewriter enterprise in which the majority of the capital was owned by the state. But it failed.

The Ministry of Industry, in order to safeguard jobs and the enterprise itself, and seeing that it was possible to convert it to the electronic sector, tried to negotiate the sale of Messa to Centrel (privately owned, for the most part). However the value of its assets did not exceed 400,000 contos, by much, while its liabilities came to more than 900,000. Centrel was ready to take over all of the liabilities to the extent of the value of the assets but no more, while it would undertake not to dismiss any workers for a period of 5 years.

Since the debts were to the banks, the welfare and social security systems, the Ministry of Industry proposed that the state itself assume them. However there were those who opposed this plan, in the name of the law and the precedents which a negotiation of this sort might establish.

And so, in the name of precedent and bureaucracy, the risk of complete bankruptcy for an enterprise and the plunging of all of its workers into unemployment is being run, since Rocha de Matos at Centrel will not, obviously, agree to assume all of Messa's debts.

#### National Merchant Marine

To return to SENTENAVE, the philosophy of the Ministry of Industry is beginning to win out to a certain extent in the Council of Ministers, although the Ministry of Finance as well as has given its consent, but not without some discussion.

SENTENAVE was recognized as being of basic importance to the reconstruction of our merchant fleet. The Merchant Marine is in fact a sector in which we have been seriously lagging, to the extent of even raising a question about certain aspects of our national security. According to the figures we have been able to study, our security in terms of foodstuffs and energy supplies would be at serious risk at such time as foreign vessels might decide to boycott us. We are at this time almost entirely vulnerable. Only about 10 percent of what we consume is transported by our own vessels which are, in addition, old and obsolete. And we paid foreign shipowners about 40 million contos in freight charges last year. A few days ago the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers] referred to a figure of 80 million contos, which seems to us somewhat exaggerated.

Whatever the case, what is certain is that we do not have the fleet to transport our product needs. We are paying freight charges to foreign owners, although it would be possible to build our ships here, maintaining jobs for some years and contributing to our development and national security.

There will be then other contracts with foreign firms, some of which have already been signed and which involve trade with Yugoslavia and Denmark, dating back to the days of Sa Carneiro and involving the personal intervention with then-president Tito by Eanes. And there are also other contracts with Brazil.

However, we may see the international economy pick up as the Council of Ministers statement predicted, although it also provides for "the drafting of a scheme for redimensioning the enterprise, which may in the future lead to its gradual deactivation, although in such a case it would guarantee the maintenance of operational conditions such as to enable it to respond promptly to a future recovery of the naval construction market."

In brief, SETENAVE will not yet die, but many people who earn their living working in the shipyards will suffer forced suspension. This will certainly be the first example of the mass "dismissals."

5157

CSO: 3542/220

## GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS CONCERNING AUSTERITY EXAMINED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial: "The One-Time Evil"]

[Text] For the first time since it took office, the government has sent the people of Portugal a note of hope. Long-term hope, it is true, but even so, it has a better ring than that other word we have become accustomed to here as the sole promise and to understand in all its implications for daily domestic government--austerity.

Only because the holidays are about to end and with them the respite enjoyed by the Executive Branch in this first phase of its term of office, we will not be so unjust as to conclude that the somewhat less dramatic tone Mario Soares and Mota Pinto gave to their assessment speech had the concealed tactical purpose of reducing the maneuvering room of the opposition in the coming months, both in the political and social realms. The words of public men have, or should have on all occasions, the value of a permanent commitment to the citizens to whom they are addressed, and it would not be reasonable to state the contrary without proof--that this commitment can be superseded by tactical or strategic interests. There remains little for the people of Portugal to do for the present except to trust in the intention voiced by the government leaders: to do everything to prevent the emergency situation from extending indefinitely.

This is little, those whose economic difficulties were already intolerable when they embarked on "austerity" 2 months ago and who are today living on the edge of poverty would say. Mario Soares responds with a promise that is a relief to the majority of the citizens. "No sacrifices beyond those already announced will be asked, and these already represent the beginning of hope for the future." And he added a prophesy: "There will be difficulties, but there will be no hunger." Could this last statement represent a concrete analysis of the real situation being experienced today, and a more or less accurate analysis of the future? What is happening in the homes of the 400,000 unemployed persons, according to the government figures, and what will happen to the 100,000 other wage-earners who, in the worst of cases, and again according to the Executive Branch, may lose their jobs shortly? And how will the tens of thousands of Portuguese citizens with back wages owed, many of them for a number of months, live? It is hard to guarantee that the problems of food supply have not already knocked at the door for many families, and that they will not in the future plague vast sectors of the

population, particularly since the effects of the restrictive measures approved to date will not as yet have been felt to their full extent.

Either because the 100 days which the PS [Socialist Party] set for itself as the period for implementing an equal number of measures not limited to the austerity norms already known, or because its accounting report might raise some questions about certain electoral speeches, Mario Soares and Mota Pinto would prefer to use a nonarithmetic procedure in making the first assessment of their government activities. The 100 measures for 100 days were not even mentioned in the document distributed to journalists.

It is not expected of a government that, after 3 months in office, it will immediately undertake a self-critical report, both because this is not the duty of those in the government, and because it would be too soon for such an approach. In any case, the Executive Branch headed by Mario Soares has now undertaken a public justification of its actions, accepting the unpopularity of the measures it promulgated--only one does not understand, because it is illogical, the conviction that it "consolidated its social base of support"--and above all, it has given austerity a meaning. It gave its word in guaranteeing that the 18-month emergency program will not be extended, and it gave indications that the 2- or 3-year economic recovery program will not be as drastic as in 1983 and 1984. If this is the case, it will have observed the Machiavellian principle so much to the taste of Jaime Gama, by imposing the painful measures all at once, while promulgating the pleasant ones gradually. Only the future can tell if Machiavelli's perfidious advice was suited to the good intentions of the government.

5157

CSO: 3542/220

## LEGISLATURE AUTHORS LABOR LAYOFF MEASURES

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Sep 83 p 4

[Text] The legislative authorization allowing the cabinet to rule on the temporary suspension of workers (layoff) was published in the DIARIO DA REPUBLICA yesterday, and goes into effect today.

Under the terms of this document, the government will have as its basis the principle of free negotiation between the enterprise and the workers' collective, with provisions for the allocation of "socially just remuneration, to which the Unemployment Fund may make a contribution."

It will be the duty of the Ministry of Labor to establish the budgets for the application of this system to the public and private enterprises.

New reactions to the government undertaking have been voiced, meanwhile. The president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Azores says that the law "is of very doubtful real interest, and is not consistent with the expectations of businessmen." The Oporto Highway Workers Union voiced "the most violent objection to the project."

5157

CSO: 3542/220



## BRIEFS

PORTUGUESE ESCUDO DEVALUATION--The Portuguese escudo has undergone an effective devaluation of 19.8 percent over the first nine months of this year, according to Bank of Portugal data. This loss of Portuguese monetary value is the result of an official government devaluation last June--resulting in a 12 percent overall devaluation--and the sliding devaluation that this, in turn, produced. The depreciation of the escudo during 1982 was 11.98 percent. The issuing Portuguese bank computes the actual devaluation rate of national currency against 18 foreign currencies, measured relative to the level of these countries' commercial relations with Portugal. (Text) (Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 13 Oct 83 p 53)

CSO: 3548/35

## ANDALUCIA TOPS LAND REFORM SEMINAR, REFORM BILL

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 49

[Article by Salvador Arancibia]

[Text] Seville--"Agrarian reform as a historic program that broached the problem of agriculture is an obsolete program appropriate to other stages of development not only of Spain as a whole but also and in particular of Andalucia," Carlos Tio Saralegui, director of the technical office of the Ministry of Agriculture, said in his presentation at the seminar on agrarian reform held in Seville and organized by the Menendez Pelayo International University.

It appears that the seminar will be the setting where Miguel Manaute, agricultural adviser of the Board of Andalucia, will present the government bill for agrarian reform.

The chairman of the Board of Andalucia announced in early spring the intention of his office to submit for approval an agrarian reform bill for Andalucia. A working group has drawn up since then various drafts which have ended up as a government bill.

Even though the content of this bill is not known precisely, it seems that the major contours of the said agrarian reform do not go so much for the forceful expropriation of land that would meet the conditions mandated in the draft as for the application of the Law of Forced Leasing. The Spanish Constitution recognizes the possibility that private property can be expropriated in the common interest but it mandates as an essential counterpart the provision of equitable compensation to those who see themselves deprived of their property.

The seminar on agrarian reform has clear-cut political connotations in the Andalusian situation and this explains the massive attendance. Everything indicates that there is a lack of dialogue between the central administration and the Board of Andalucia, given that the central government obtained a rough draft of the proposed bill when the latter was completely finalized.

Both the director of the technical office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Professor Angel Serrano noted in their comments that the possible agrarian reform had been conveniently forgotten by the parties of the Left in the development stage.

Only when the economic recession became more pronounced, with the return of migrants [workers] and with the new settlement of agrarian localities by unemployed individuals, was the possibility of putting into effect agrarian reform that would change the agrarian structure overall and not only that of private property re-examined.

2662

CSO: 3548/4

## CLARIFICATION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS KEY STEP IN SOLUTION

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text] The recent debate in Congress on the state of the nation became entangled in a thicket of statistics and international comparisons which, even though they did not contribute significantly to citizens' understanding of Spain's economic situation, could serve to conceal it in addition to surprising some people with the peculiarities of our parliamentary customs.

The Spanish economy is at the same point where it was at the start of summer when many analysts mentioned the possibility of examining the appropriateness of rigorous stabilization: A sizable budgetary deficit which fuels private demand; a disquieting foreign trade imbalance, momentarily level because of the seasonal visit of foreign tourists; and finally a quasi-pathological inability to create industrial employment. The other facet of this coin is a deeply rooted predisposition of nearly all citizens, be they workers or managers, to ask the state for help for nearly all their ills. Unfortunately, to satisfy this demand is not within the ability of any Western government. Additionally, under existing international economic and political conditions, it is practically impossible to eliminate the uncertainties and the unknowns. Even though economic reactivation is taking shape in the United States, doubts remain as regards both its duration and the possibility that the reactivation will spread in concentric circles like a spot of oil to the other economies of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] member-states. Obviously, Spain is not part of the second circle--Germany, Japan, Canada--and perhaps in all probability not even of the third circle. At the other extreme, the countries of the Third World and especially the Latin American countries are not finding adequate formulas to face their external debt which exceeds \$700 billion. Throughout the summer a collapsed was feared similar to that of the past year that would lead to a second chain of suspensions in payments in the renegotiation of the debt.

The Spanish economy, constantly more interdependent with the world economy, is floundering between the voluntaristic aspirations of growth capable of generating increased employment and the burdensome continuation of the financial imbalances of the public sector and the foreign sector, whose worsening would cause increased unemployment. The situation however is still manageable and

the imbalances are rectifiable, but the margin of maneuver is becoming narrower as the months go by. In this respect, it does not seem realistic for the government to clutch at straws at the sight of any indicator--for example, the drop in inflation--to sell to the country the idea that reactivation is getting closer and that the growth of the foreign debt will not lead our country to join those most needful of assistance by international organizations.

The prime minister and the minister of economy and finance have recalled that increase in exports during the first few months of the year was close to 5 percent in volume (that is, in physical aggregates). However, the statistics for the month of July 1983 indicate somewhat gloomier prospects--that the increase in exports is traceable in large part to oil byproducts which include previous imports of crude oil and the sales of General Motors automobiles, sales which, in the best of cases, will remain flat in the coming year. There do not seem to be prospects for increased exports in 1984. On the other hand, imports have risen above estimates, which evidences the vigor that private demand continues to have. And the import momentum would have been even greater if a kind of efficient administrative check had not been applied. This type of deterrent makes it difficult, for example, to import consumer goods from the Orient, which in the case of the EEC represent 25 percent of internal production. Iron-and-steel products, chemicals and textiles are protected by these disguised forms of protectionism whose purpose is to maintain the employment level that would be even smaller if competitive goods were to enter with fewer restrictions. Fortunately, Spain's negotiations with the European Common Market will involve further delays owing specifically to the protectionist practices with which the "Ten" [EEC members] harass each other. Thus, the protectionism denounced by everyone but which no one tackles in fact will make it possible to continue to conceal the inefficiency of a portion of Spain's productive system. The delay in our negotiations with the EEC nevertheless entails uncertainties for agricultural exports, which are a genuinely dynamic and competitive sector.

Even though officials in charge of economic matters have also asserted that the deficit in the public sector is being corrected, the figures released do not prove to be so convincing. The use of Treasury funds by the Bank of Spain from the start of the year to mid-September 1983 totals about 600 billion pesetas, a figure similar to the corresponding period of 1982. But during these same months the Bank of Spain has had to cover the savings of the private sector in an amount that is nearly twice the total of withdrawals last year.

The OECD has just finished publishing a study on unemployment in the territory of its member-states. The European prospects--those of Spain among the most significant--are gloomy and do not evidence signs of improvement because of the rigid nature of the labor market. The high wage costs and nonwage costs, guaranteed employment, and the inflexibility of working hours and location have converted cyclical unemployment stemming from the recession into a structural problem whose remedy is beginning to be found beyond any increment in the Gross Domestic Product. It is not a coincidence that in the Spanish case the import of capital goods currently represents 60 percent of the value of domestic production, with an increase of 20 points in the past 3 or 4 years. This phenomenon is one of the clearest demonstrations of labor substitution, payable in pesetas but expensive, for equipment payable in foreign exchange but relatively cheaper.



These are the difficulties which today characterize the state of the Spanish economy. Without underestimating its gravity, there are still opportunities to make corrections as long as the government explains its moves clearly and convinces public officials that the state cannot solve all problems and that each individual must make some sacrifice. But while the problems are concealed or are disguised with the purpose of leaving no room for pessimism just as occurred in the debate about the state of the nation, the system runs a serious risk of breaking down and then the correction of imbalances will be much more difficult and the adjustments much more dramatic.

2662

CSO: 3748/4

## BRIEFS

PCE INTENSIFIES PRESSURE OVER ANDALUCIAN LABOR CRISIS--Iglesias, who personified the support of his party for the march of field hands organized by workers' committees, attacked the "policy of privileges" which the executive is carrying out and the "nonfulfillment" of the electoral program which the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers' Party] presented. Hardly a moment after the announcement of "massive rallies" made recently by the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], the communists have passed from words to action, with acts of solidarity with the Andalusian field hands. There is no doubt that agrarian reform specifically and the government's economic policy in general, together with the old issue of NATO, are the warhorses which the PCE has decided to use in the short term to obtain electoral gain from the more leftist ranks of the PSOE. Connected with this strategy are the criticisms of the government which Gerardo Iglesias made yesterday in Granada, centered in an analysis whose conclusion is that the government "conducts a constantly more rightist policy and a true policy of change is not made with concessions to the right." For Iglesias, the policy of change is made "with the support of PCE, workers' committees and social forces." Within the PCE's strategy is "giving the government a piece of one's mind to force it to comply with its program," but at the same time "without overdoing it." The thrust of the criticisms of the secretary general was directed at the fact that "primacy is not given to public investment, nor is tax reform being undertaken." But however, "the purchasing power of the worker has been decreased and pensions have been blocked." He accused the government of "continuing its alignment with Reagan's policies," of not having brought about reform of government administration, or democratized the army of "maintaining the military character of the Guardia Civil." [Excerpts] [Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 Sep 83 p 19] 9678

CSO: 3548/1

## KETENCI EYES LABOR LEGISLATION IMPACT ON WAGES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 8 Sep 83 p 9

[Article by Sukran Ketenci in the column "Worker's World": "Wages"]

[Text] Laws dealing with the new union code, problems in converting to the union code, amendments to the labor law, that is to say, developments involving wages and collective contracts concluded by the SAC [Supreme Arbitration Council], have been topics of public debate for some time. No little part is played in this by the thought: "It is mostly over, little remains. The SAC's job expires on 1 January 1984."

Yet, following the transition to free bargaining, for the jobs and workplaces where strikes are banned, resolution of disagreements in strike deferrals and a number of other things will go to a SAC hardly different from its present organization. Those unable to take advantage fully of the deregulated union activity or the right to strike--roughly half of all unionized workers--will expect resolution of disagreements by the SAC if no results are obtained in collective bargaining negotiations. In short, the SAC, which was established under special legislation after 12 September, has become institutionalized and will have a heavy impact on future union activities. Moreover, since the terms of a significant majority of the contracts concluded by the SAC for the transition period will run on into 1984, 1984 wages for a very large majority of workers will be set by the SAC outside the collective bargaining process.

Leaving aside the issue of the removal from the collective contracts concluded by the SAC of many of the established social rights which had been earned in the past 17 years, statistical studies of the future will doubtless lay out plainly what has been given and what taken in wages as well. A rough outline of developments based on the SAC's decisions in principle which are in the public domain appears as follows:

In 1979 and 1980 when inflation was raging in excess of 100 percent, contracts were being concluded by the unions in the free bargaining process with wage increases varying between 150 percent and 350 percent. The SAC, in effecting on behalf of the unions the contracts for these years which the unions had been unable to conclude owing to deadlocked strikes or other disagreements, allowed a maximum wage increase of 80 percent for the current year or, at most, 120

percent for 2 years. Thus huge differences arose between the union contracts and the SAC contracts for the same years.

According to statistics, which vary depending on the source but which may be considered official, inflation in 1981 was 34 percent and in 1982, 36 percent. The SAC's decisions in principle for those years which covered all workers who were unionized and under collective contract at the time were announced as 15 percent plus 4,000 and 15 percent plus 3,000. In practice, a few of the contracts concluded went over these announced rates, but most were significantly lower. In fact, at the State Economic Enterprises and workplaces which were still covered by union contracts concluded during 1979-1980 when wages were considered to be high, contracts were renewed with wage increases of 6 percent-9 percent. Contracts were placed in effect for some workplaces in which the gross went as low as 1,500 liras-2,500 liras.

On the theory that inflation would not exceed 20 percent for 1983, the SAC announced its decision in principle as a maximum of 20 percent plus 1,500 liras. In general, the contracts placed in effect had lower rates. However, statistics for 1983, as well as ministerial announcements, offer an inflation indicator in excess of 30 percent. So TURK-IS, for this reason, wants the SAC rule, announced as indexed to inflation, changed and the announced contract wage increases of 20 percent revised upward to 30 percent. Thus it is that worker wages are again becoming a public issue.

To counter the criticism directed against them, SAC circles were saying at one point that they made frequent statistical breakdowns of all wage-related developments and would reveal how inter-workplace differences arose during the 17 years of the free union process. Doubtless, the statistics will show the aberrations of a period in which union competition was whipped into a fury by political administrations and employers in line with their own interests. The same statistics, however, if presented to the public accurately and with all the data, will also show what the SAC process has given and what it has taken away. We will thus be able to have a solid look at wage developments since around 1963 and will be able to make sound judgments.

2349

OSD: 3554/422

## RADICAL LIBERAL PARTY CONGRESS DEBATES EUROMISSILES, TAXES

## Ambiguous Euromissile Resolutions

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Sep 83 p 6

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Radicals Disagree on Euromissiles"]

[Text] The Green Radicals, desiring to sharpen the profile of the Radical Liberal Party, won a victory at the party congress over the weekend. The chairman of the group does not think that this Radical line will be fatal to the Government but that the government will listen to this Radical signal.

Opinions are quite divided within the Radical Liberal Party about how the party's position on disarmament is to be practiced in the Folketing. The wing that nonetheless demands action on the disarmament issue, no matter from where; the wing that is behind any possible proposals and resolutions; the wing that puts this ahead of cooperation with the government on economic issue did, however, clearly get the upper hand at the party congress. Group Chairman Niels Helveg Peterson supports the majority's viewpoints but seems, however, to want to attempt to balance the position so it will not prove fatal to the government.

At the party congress over the weekend, two members of the party who have aligned themselves with the party's security policy line, Arne Stinus and Jens Bilgrav Nilsen, both cautioned against immediate promises for support of new initiatives in October from the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party involving the deployment of the Euromissiles. They maintained that domestic policy motives could be behind that.

Kjeld Johansen, Gudhjem, strongly opposed this viewpoint:

"From time to time it can be painful to have a policy. If we do not firmly hold to the issue concerning the missiles for fear of elections, we have shown that we can be scared into anything. We must send a clear signal to the thousands in the peace movements who are not Socialists." Vibeke Bruhn, Copenhagen, followed with these remarks: "Can the Radicals allow themselves to



ascribe tactical motives to other parties. We have no use for pretty words with no content." Kr. Thule Hansen, Gislev, maintained that it would not be clever Radical policy to throw suspicion on other parties' political motives--especially not those parties the Radicals must work with on the missile issue.

#### Two Resolutions

The party congress passed a resolution which holds the government to the commitment of working actively for not deploying the missiles. In addition to that, an independent resolution from the Green Radicals was passed. It states:

"The Radical Liberal Party will maintain a policy that through all democratic means will prevent the deployment of new nuclear missiles in Europe, even if this position has political consequences in domestic affairs."

At the party congress, Radical Liberal Party Group Leader Niels Helveg Petersen participated in the internal fight about the position on a new possible resolution from the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party.

"It is my opinion that it is our duty to support any proposal that can contribute to counteracting the deployment. Today we do not know what resolution proposals will be submitted. We do not know whether it may turn out that the Radical group will submit a proposal," he said.

Personally Niels Helveg Petersen does not believe that the missile issue will cause national elections.

"I hope that the government reads the signals from here and I hope with that we get the missile policy we want," he said.

#### Anti-Euromissile Forces Gain Posts

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Sep 83 p 6

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "'Green Radicals' on Executive Board"]

[Text] Great changes in priorities took place in personal choices to the executive board at the Radical Liberal Party Congress this weekend and the so-called "Green Radicals" got three of the members they had recommended in advance elected. They are Ole Lauritzen, shipowner, Kernmarie Exteen, teacher and Hann Lofquist, teacher. The latter was already a member of the executive board.

The national congress elects 15 executive board members, while the remainder of the executive board is filled from leagues and district elections. Kr. Thule Hansen, Gislev, received the top scores during the executive board elections last year and he repeated this top score yesterday after a speech on Saturday which was very critical of the parliamentary group. Last year's runner-up, Asger Baunshak-Jensen, Farum, just made fourth place this year. Number two this year was the party's vice chairman and EF candidate, Keld Anker Nilsen, Silkeborg. The former member of parliament, Jens Jorgen Bolvig, was number three.

Both during the debate and during the vote, the "Green Radicals" put their mark on the congress. In a debate paper called the "radish," which was distributed at the congress, the group in an editorial criticized the changes of the assistance law for which the Radical Liberal Party has voted. This law requires the daily benefits rate follow the other wage developments opposite to what the parliamentary group of the Radical Liberal Party has voted for and in the long run poses a series of demands for tax reform, profit sharing and promotion of the cooperative movement.

The parliamentary group has five members on the executive board. The political spokesman for the group, Ole Vig Jensen and Janne Normann, did not want to run again and in their place Lone Dybkjaer and Ase Olesen were elected along with Niels Helveg Petersen, Bernhard Baunsgaard and Tage Dragbye who was on the board already.

#### Compromise With Coalition Anticipated

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Sep 83 p 6

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen: "Believes in Compromise with the Government"]

[Text] A resolution passed at the Radical Liberal Party Congress rejects any form of general tax relief. The party will support savings of billions but not in the social area.

In connection with the upcoming negotiations of the 1984 budget bill, the Radical Liberal Party will pose concrete demands for improvements for families with children and at the same time reject a series of the government's proposed savings. Nevertheless, the Radical Liberal party group chairman, Niels Helveg Petersen, thinks that a reasonable agreement about the budget bill can be reached between the government and the party. He rejects as a real possibility that the Radical Liberal Party will pose a demand for savings of billions in military expense in connection with the budget bill. Such a proposal was submitted by Tage Traeby, member of parliament, at the Radical Liberal Party Congress over the weekend.

The Radical Liberal Party will support the government's proposal of increasing the contribution to the Sick Leave Benefit Fund which will yield the state additional revenue of 2 billion kroner. The party wants to support an increase of the contribution to the a-funds from wage earners and employers which will yield 1.4 billion kroner. With the newly implemented savings on the block grants, the commitment of Radical Liberal Party is thereby around 5 billion kroner, states Niels Helveg Petersen.

The party does not want to accept the government's proposal for an insurance scheme for the highest incomes in connection with medical and hospital services. But the party will, however, negotiate providing funds by having the highest income persons contribute more in this area. "It is not the money but the principle that separates us," says Petersen about the 1.4 billion kroner the government wants to raise in this area.

## No to Lower Taxes

What the Radical Liberal Party is rejecting is the government's changing of the child allowances and day care payments which the government is currently presenting. This is the proposal for daily benefits with lower rates during the first 3 years of membership of an a-fund and tightening of the job offer law.

The Radicals do not like the government's proposal of abolishing the milk grants. They prefer a continued indexations of the so-called poison taxes on cigarettes, beer and alcohol. That would yield the state a revenue of 425 to 450 million kroner.

The Radicals want to maintain the current tax ceiling of 73 percent and instead reject the government's proposal of 70 percent. The national congress passed an independent resolution which rejected any general tax relief under the current economic situation.

Among the improvements for the families with children, the Radical Liberal Party wants to work for an extension of the maternity leave law, changes in the assistance law and the regulations of housing subsidies, higher limits on scholarships in day care centers and block grants to the individual institutions to promote cooperation between parents, educators and children. In a congress resolution the party maintains that it is willing to seek economic security for additional expenditures.

In addition to that the congress resolution consists of lowering the number of working hours without wage compensation and keeping the income policy the same. Finally, the statement assumes tax reform proportionally reaching the top and a surtax on the higher incomes along with the introduction of profit sharing where the workers' capital remains in the individual companies.

## Role of Government 'Support Party'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 19 Sep 83 p 8

[Editorial: "The Elephants and the Grass"]

[Text] "When the elephants fight, the grass suffers," said Niels Helveg Petersen in his speech to the Radical Liberal Party Congress. He elaborated a little further on this African saying with the words: "It can be a little difficult to be the elephant's grass. But it is, however, the grass that gives life."

To a certain extent, this is not a very bad picture he chose to use. The saying is colorful and it is especially useful when the terms of neutrality are to be illustrated. The grass serves both parties. It is there, it is used and it is trampled down. The problem is that the Radical Liberal Party does not at the moment pursue a policy in accordance with neutral observations of the two large blocs in Danish politics. The party has taken sides.

It did that 1 year ago when there was a change in the government constellation--which owes a lot to the decisiveness that hit the Radical quarters. By that the parliamentary group of the Radical Liberal Party assumed responsibilities. Not as a neutral party in a continued clash between the labor parties and the nonsocialist parties. But as part of the coalition that carries the government power.

During this one year, the parliamentary group has lived up to its responsibilities. Take note, however, there have been situations where the relationship between the government and the government support party has been somewhat tense, but overall a good, considerate and productive relationship has existed between the parties. But the government does not have its greatest problems with the Radical Liberal Party.

It is to a considerable degree due to Niels Helveg Petersen that it has been possible to create a political stability in this manner. He has tried very hard to explain to both voters and internal party audiences that the government's economic policy is essentially correct. First and foremost because that is the only possible policy. It was this position and main line which he accounted for when the Radicals held their national congress.

Free rein to criticism of the disposition of the party leadership will always be given at a party congress. This is the opportunity to tell one's heartfelt meaning without being burdened by political responsibility. And that is how it was at the Radical Liberal Party Congress. Many critical statements and many irresponsible remarks were made, especially directed toward the situation that the party leadership has so unambiguously placed the party in the government's quarters.

By doing that, the critics have, however, expressed much clearer than the group chairman what the story's true facts are. The Radical Liberal Party is not at the moment a grass field that gives equal living rights to the huge and vehemently trampling elephants. The party has picked a side. It seems at the moment rather like a small elephant which only could survive by keeping close to the elephant herd it willingly traveled with 1 year ago. If this connection is broken, it is the elephant that risks being trampled down.

9583

CSO: 3613/1

## SPECIAL SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW OFFICERS

## Tove Smidth New Deputy Chairman

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 Sep 83 p 8

[Article by Solveig Rødsgaard: "Tove Smidth Social Democratic Party's New Deputy Chairman: Hoped They Found Another, but Happy That the Trap Worked Beautifully"]

[Text] Only a few months after she announced that she wanted to go as burgomaster, because she was worn thin by the job, Tove Smidth accepted her election as her party's deputy chairman. At the same time she will return to her full-time job with Danmarks Radio [Radio Denmark]. She understands well that the challenge of two jobs is being questioned, but she feels convinced that she can manage both.

The job of organizing deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party is to be made more meaningful. Since the Social Democratic congress in 1980 surprisingly agreed that the party would have two deputy chairmen, a political and an organizing, and that the organizing deputy chairman should be a woman, it has been plain that competence problems and uncertainty regarding the job description have produced difficulties in the party leadership and at the party office.

Inge Fischer Møller gave up for health reasons. And at the Social Democratic congress the other day Tove Smidth was then chosen as acting deputy chairman for one year. The 60-year-old popular Gladsaxe burgomaster, who a few months ago declared that she had become so worn thin by the demands of the burgomaster's job that she wanted to go by November and return to a full-time job at Danmarks Radio, now wants to attend to both her radio job and give the deputy chairman's job the proper position in the party leadership. As she says, "some overlapping between the organizing and political posts will be natural."

Tove Smidth is convinced that she can manage the full-time job at Danmarks Radio although she is at the same time the Social Democratic Party's deputy chairman. She has been on leave from the radio for nine years, but is now returning to her old job in the family section, more precisely characterized as the Family Looking Glass.



"There is anyway some of my radio work which can be managed with some shifting of time. I will be able to sit at home with manuscripts and manage certain telephone conversations also from home. Personally, I have no doubt that I can get things to go well together."

"As far as the deputy chairman's post is concerned, I emphasize that I am only acting deputy chairman for one year. At the same time it is a question of an honorary job which is unpaid. Of course I want to make a contribution to the honorary job--but then it gives me some degrees of freedom."

#### Burgomaster's Job

That the challenge of two jobs is being questioned--when she has just left the burgomaster's post for work-related reasons--Tove Smidth understands well.

"It has something to do with the fact that it is very difficult to imagine how a burgomaster's job--in any case as I have experienced it--is. It is toilsome in a completely special way. It can be all right for a number of years and you can think it is nice, because the planes of contact are inexhaustible both in the large and small context. In the small context with an individual situation is an individual's life which you can enter and seriously take in hand. If I have had a handicap as burgomaster it is certainly that I was to too great an extent a hearer of cases, for I cannot shake that off me, and people come with faith in the fact that I can take part in solving their completely personal problems. In addition, there is the fact that you are on the political front line with small and large matters--and then I reached the point where things wore on me. In my new honorary assignment I will not constantly be standing on the front line; I shall take part in carrying out some organizing work in cooperation with some strong people like Anker Jørgensen, Knud Heinesen and our party secretary."

"As far as the job itself is concerned, I think that it is very difficult to separate the organizing and political aspects. It is also possible that this structure will have to be looked at and it will have to be considered whether it is the right one. I cannot say anything about this yet. I am still so new at it and we have only been able to talk very little about what kind of separation of duties we will have. But I think that some overlapping of the organizing and political aspects will be natural. Without the weight being shifted in this."

Tove Smidth does not think that it is unreasonable for her to be able to return to Danmarks Radio after her period of leave.

#### Nine-Year Leave of Absence

"You would not be able to get so many to go into political work if they did not have reasonable certainty that they could return. I am far from the first example. There is a tradition of this at Danmarks Radio, so it is not a place apart I have been given. Personally, I think it is reasonable for one to be able to return. I well know that it is difficult to effect equality in this area, because private concerns cannot do it in the same way and perhaps

in many cases also would not want to do it. But it must be considered that those who go into political work lose seniority and advancement opportunities at the spot. This is a heavy price to pay for going into politics if one has a good permanent job."

#### Time to Think It Over

When Party Chairman Anker Jørgensen telephoned Tove Smidth last Thursday to hear whether she was interested in being deputy chairman, presumably in mind was the list of the many things which Tove Smidth has been involved in over the years. Her strong point is her municipal politics experience--17 years in municipal work and the challenge of the burgomaster's job since 1974. But her social involvement is also well known--especially as far as child welfare is concerned, and then she was also for a number of years chairman of the Child Welfare Commission.

Time to think it over? "I was called when I happened to be at Brøndby Town Hall on Thursday afternoon. At this point I learned that there were many names included in the picture and that I had received the inquiry 'because it was silly to work on the idea further if it was out of the question from the outset.' I said that it sounded exciting but that I would hope anyway that they landed on someone else. When I came home late in the evening there was a message to call and I learned that I had been nominated by a unanimous executive committee for the central committee meeting next morning. One could well say that the trap worked beautifully--but I was of course also absorbed by the exciting and fascinating job. And then the unbelievably warm experience of being accepted, as I was at the congress the next day. Now it remains for me to show that what they did was right."

"When you ask what I think I can especially contribute with the deputy chairman's job, I actually asked the same question of Anker. Why he thought it was a good idea with me in the job. Well, first, he said, it was because I was a woman, and the congress had wanted a woman in the job in 1980. It was necessary to honor this desire. 'Next,' Anker said, 'you have municipal politics experience, and so you represent some attitudes which you have demonstrated through your work in the town council and in other ways--the family, youth, children and the movements which are stirring at the time.'"

#### Attitudes

"Yes, at first it sounds like a political post, but if one is to make a contribution in these areas it is necessary to operate through party associations and the party apparatus in order to effect some of these attitudes if this is what the party wants. There will be a question of better contact with my party's municipal authorities."

#### Municipal Politics

"Personally, I think that it was a mistake when it was decided at a congress that one could not be a burgomaster and a Folketing member at the same time.

Theoretically it is correct that the work should be spread over as many as possible, but it is useful if there is someone in the central agencies who has close contact with the entire municipal world, for this is unbelievably important in the total community picture."

"So I think that it is possible to improve contact with the Social Democratic city council groups. I have this experience, and it is exactly because it is not possible to have a double post that there has been too little contact between the Social Democratic municipal administration members, the Folketing group and the party leadership. It is just as though the municipal sector has been somewhat overlooked. This is how we experience it when we are out and around. It is not just I who has this opinion; I know there are others who have experienced it in the same way. I hope I can straighten this out."

#### Signals

Tove Smidth also believes that one of her areas of work will be "to create greater openness toward the new signals present at the time, so they are not perceived as something threatening the customary."

"I think, for example, that something which often happens in political work is that in our party they are a little apprehensive about listening to the new signals, because, they say, another party has already taken out a patent for this. This should not play this big role, for if the idea is right as such it should be taken up by our party, too."

#### Svend Auken Voted Political Spokesman

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Dan Axél: "The New Social Democratic Spokesman is an 'Academician and Streetwise'"]

[Text] "A streetwise academician with the labor movement's firm ground under his feet. A bid for a break with a foggy opposition policy. Witty and sharp. And of the right age."

Such was the characterization given by a seasoned Social Democrat--a member of the Folketing--of whom he at the same time called the "lifesaver we need so badly for the public--and the only one who can say a few non-socialist words to the government and get away with it."

These words fell--according to the account--on the Social Democratic congress last weekend regarding Svend Auken--a few hours before he, against the leadership's wish, was elected by a large majority as his party's political spokesman.

And although Svend Auken's style is known in the Folketing, he certainly surprised a number of radio listeners and TV viewers when he in his new debut speech with great enthusiasm--and not without humor--spoke words of thunder to the Progressive Party and the government during the extra gathering on

Friday. It was a decidedly different and more direct speech than has long been heard from the party, which is having a job with the aftereffects from last year, when it gave up the power of governing.

While Auken's party comrades could not hold their laughter back when he engaged in a duel of brief remarks with Kresten Poulsen at the Folketing's speaker's bench, the members of the government parties were so cultivated that they did not laugh aloud, but did have problems keeping a straight face. The opposition's mouthpiece must not think we was anything.

If the Social Democratic leadership does not correct too many words in the spokesman's speeches which Svend Auken will deliver in the time to come, then it indicates that the seasoned Social Democrat is right. There will then be a question of strong popularizing of the Social Democratic Party's image--the picture which listeners, viewers and newspaper readers are served of the country's biggest party.

It could appear intentional that the party at the same time has placed a popular woman in another top post in the Social Democratic hierarchy, namely, Gladsaxe Burgomaster Tove Smidth. But it indeed is not: The top of the Social Democratic Party--Anker Jørgensen, Heinesen and Ritt Bjerregaard--indeed did not want Svend Auken as political spokesman. Each individually for different reasons, presumably.

The same observer as above says, "This serves the leadership right. Finally the Folketing group has pulled itself together and voted according to its conviction."

Thirty-eight of the 53 Social Democratic Folketing members who voted regarding the spokesman's post at the party congress chose Svend Auken. Fifteen voted for the leadership's candidate--former Economy Minister Ivar Nørgaard. A strong handshake for the former labor minister from the rank and file.

With the election to the post of political spokesman, Svend Auken moved up on a line with the party's "crown princess," the deputy chairman of the group, Ritt Bjerregaard, who he, incidentally, is in a coffee club with. These two now rank in the pyramid directly under Chairman Anker Jørgensen. Svend Auken is also moving into the very important listening post as a member of the LO's [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] executive committee, where he will get an opportunity to cultivate his especially good connections with the trade union movement.

However, Svend Auken himself far from resembles an ambitious climber. The picture is almost always the same: a good 2-meter-high figure, shirt outside of his pants (with a tendency to be baggy seated), loud and smiling impudently.

But the biography of this man Auken speaks for something else: student of classical languages, candidate in political science, active in the student movement at the beginning of the 60's, cofounder of Social Democrats Against EEC, elected to the Folketing at 28, deputy chairman of the group from 1975 to 1977, political spokesman in 1977 and labor minister the same year.



## Auken Subject of Economic Scandal

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 12 Sep 83 p 10

[Editorial: "Auken's Mess"]

[Text] Former Labor Minister Svend Auken--who has just been elevated to the post of his party's political spokesman--came in his term as minister to act in several respects as a strain on business and on the Danish economy. Concerns got to feel this through costly reforms in, for example, the working environment area. It was also Svend Auken who was the sponsor of the competition-dislocating job creation legislation, just as several other initiatives in the employment policy area put gray hair on the heads of business, municipalities and counties.

Svend Auken was a very active minister who seldom had big misgivings when it was a question of new arrangements within his official area.

So much the more curious it must seem that the energetic politician was not at all successful in settling the matter of interest on the State's advance funds for unemployment subsidies. As early as 1976 a committee under the Labor Directorate had, by the way, discussed this question and the National Auditing Office had pointed to a solution with the use of the Giro. But the level of activity in this area was low in Minister Auken's time.

An offer from 1980 from the Bank of Jutland for considerably better payment of interest on this money according to available information did not reach the minister. It was actually refused from official quarters. This is truly sensational. For surely no one can reasonably have been of the opinion that the Bank of Jutland, which is one of the country's big financial institutions, would have been incapable of solving this problem. Of course, great responsibility rests on the labor director in this matter. If the director of a private concern through his actions, or lack thereof, combined with concealment from his board of directors, had been the cause of the company's losing income to the tune of an amount in the 3-figure millions, his pink slip would guaranteedly be lying ready once the situation had been discovered. In the available data it is difficult to find any excuse for the labor director's arrangements.

But former Labor Minister Svend Auken's responsibility in the matter extends further than to the question of the Bank of Jutland's offer. The Labor Directorate's entire handling of the matter took place on his responsibility. That subsidy funds of the nature cited ought to receive the best interest possible must be regarded as an elementary State financial consideration. It is difficult to get around the fact that Auken by his passivity in the matter ignored this consideration.

Svend Auken has always placed emphasis on keeping the line to the LO open. Things were to happen quickly in his term as minister. But apparently there was not such a great hurry when it concerned having consideration for the Treasury. Accordingly, in many ways he became an expensive acquaintance.



## YUGOSLAV PAPER INTERVIEWS PCI'S PAJETTA

AU071900 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Oct 83 p 15

[Vladimir Matovic report on an interview given by Giancarlo Pajetta to BORBA at the Neptun Hotel on Brioni "in September"]

[Excerpts] [Unidentified reporter] You are the most consistent advocate of the policy: The international communist movement has to be an innovator itself in order to be able to change the world. Is there anything new?

[Pajetta] Yes. Not only because along with the old models in the modern world, there are also new ones, but because of the people's knowledge, their growing awareness of the need for a constant search for new things. These searches in Yugoslavia are well known. Something new has been happening in China, too. I am not talking about similarities between the results of the searches of these two countries, but about a common awareness of the need for new searches. I am talking about the danger of lagging behind at some out-dated sections of the road. The most recent of Andropov's speeches even point to this direction.

## Beyond Yugoslav Borders

[Reporter] You have mentioned searching in Yugoslavia....

[Pajetta] I am not enough of an expert to publicly discuss the economic and social problems you are facing. What I know is that your position and the role you play in the world transcends the borders not only of your country, but also of the continent. We are holding this conversation at the very place where Tito created and built the theory and practice of nonalignment. The movement has managed to prove its vitality; it has resisted the efforts to divide it and to liquidate it afterwards. Of course, there are conflicts and crises inside the movement. Why would anyone try to conceal it? That is your position on the world plane I was talking about. There are questions which are most closely connected with this position, questions we have failed to discuss, and they are unavoidable for us. They interweave with these international questions and with your role, and possibly clash in some aspects.

[Reporter] How would you assess the present situation in the ideology and practice of Eurocommunism?

[Paletta] The question is too complex. Ruling centers in many countries have launched a strong campaign with a view to proving that "Eurocommunism is dead," that it has left the political scene and historical stage. At the same time, some of these centers stimulate an insane arms race because of the alleged danger of international communism and its activity in the Western world....

[Reporter] Anticommunism and propagandist-psychological and other activities are very much discussed in Yugoslavia at the moment.

[Paletta] In a divided world, with imperialism which defends itself by attacking, it would be really ridiculous, grotesque, to be surprised--some are even disgusted--by the activity or the existence of anticommunist centers. The attitude which has been prevalent in my party for a long time is that one should not justify or explain one's defeats by the enemy's activity. Revealing one's own shortages and difficulties is much more useful.

[Reporter] The damage communists themselves do to the movement or, as we would put it, "to the advantage of their own disadvantage" are being more and more discussed in our country also.

#### We Are All Friends And Enemies

[Paletta] That is a wonderful wordplay, but unfortunately it is not only that. This is a part of our communist reality, of the history of the international workers movement. Is it necessary to remind people all the time or to prove again and again that the combat readiness of the USSR on the eve of the last world war was damaged more by internal purges than by numerous external enemies. There are many elements which can stimulate a discussion on this topic, and I will name only one: At the latest conference in Berlin, we said in our documents that criticism directed toward the Soviet Union from a socialist country or a friendly party cannot be called anticommunism or anti-Sovietism. However, PRAVDA has described our documents on Poland and Afghanistan as a "desecration." Alright, we can have different views or approaches, and that is good. Nevertheless, we deal with politics, and for how long are we going to have this theology in our movement?

I keep pointing out that friendship does not imply total agreement in views. It especially does not imply suppressing one's opinion, even if the friend does not like it. As for me, personally, I cannot stop myself from thinking about a recently learned fact: In one country, the news about the downing of the South Korean plane was publicly announced a week after it happened. My way of thinking leads me to concluding that what is involved in that country is not having or no longer having a free press; what is involved is respect or disdain for the people who have an elementary right to know.

As regards "enemies within our ranks," I could never understand how it can be possible for anyone to uncover them before they declare themselves and even before they are asked. How can we uncover enemies before discussion and action; how can we achieve an attitude or a good policy without confronting

opinions? No one among us is a proven friend or enemy.... We are all both friends and enemies. We can prove what we are only through action.... Uncovering enemies before the act is a problematic job....

[Reporter] Can one also speak about the crisis with the international communist movement, about its dimension?

[Pajetta] Anything can be discussed from different points of view; the more points of view, the greater are the possibilities for better solutions. As regards your question on the real situation in our movement, I am more inclined to assess that communists are undergoing a great trial, an historical test. They are facing the need for deeper investigations and for greater enrichment of both visions and goals....

Our generations were brought up on books about the last stage of capitalism. They actually analyzed the last days of dying capitalism. It is indisputable that we are witnessing a deep crisis in the modern capitalist world. Nevertheless, is there not a need for a more comprehensive and deeper study both of the history of capitalism and of the most modern forms of its resistance? We must learn more reliable lessons about crisis. They are obviously still very topical. Why should only capitalists study and learn from history?

#### Why I Do Not Like Prophets

[Reporter] What can you predict as to the limits of the current crisis--the economic, political, moral crisis...?

[Pajetta] I do not like prophets. They are most often wrong. When crises are concerned, I prefer studies. Where does the thesis come from that economic crises automatically contribute to the radicalization of revolutionary development? The crisis in Italy between the two wars, for instance, led to fascism in Germany to Nazism. The whole of Europe felt the pressure on the workers class, on democracy. It is most dangerous to think within only one dimension, superficially, and to believe that the crisis will lead capitalism to difficulties [word indistinct]--a breakdown.

Social troubles, strikes, riots compel capitalism to fight "to the very end," to start new adventures or forms of cooperation on the international level. I shall stress that what we communists lack, or are too late with, is an analysis of the many forms of the capitalist crisis. Perhaps this is why there is a delay in making proposals for the formulation of political attitudes during a crisis, when capitalism is obviously already reacting through new forms of resistance. This is why it is too dangerous to adopt conclusions based on unreliable and biased research. Let us recall the time when we called social democrats social fascists, with a belief that a crisis can be solved only in a political way.

## NATIONAL COUNCIL CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS REPORTED

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 21 Sep 83 p 3

[Excerpt] Despite the decision of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] to withdraw its two candidates for election to the Higher National Defense Council (CSDN) (Anacoreta Correia and Abreu Lima), and its stated intention of supporting the candidates nominated jointly by the majority parties (Jose Luis Nunes and Angelo Correia), since the majority of Christian democrats believe that the parliamentary representatives on the CSDN should be elected as speedily as possible, "with a view to the prestige of this organ of the greatest importance in building the democratic state of law, which has taken on in our view the characteristics of an almost sovereign body"--the truth is that this support was not sufficient to elect Angelo Correia with the necessary two-thirds majority. The former minister of internal administration won only 116 votes, 22 less than the required number (138). Only Jose Luis Nunes (PS [Socialist Party]) was elected, with eight votes more than the minimum.

The majority parties again evidenced disagreement in connection with the candidate for the presidency of the National Planning Council (CNP) (Vaz Portugal, of the PSD [Social Democratic Party]), who again did not win the required minimum of two-thirds of the votes of the deputies present (202). The former minister of agriculture and fishing needed seven more votes than were cast for him in the ballot box.

With regard to the Mass Media Council (CCS), it was the candidate of one of the majority parties (Nandim de Carvalho, of the PSD) who, in yesterday's voting, won the fewest votes (120), ranking below the opposition candidates (Manuel Gusmao, of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] and Paulo Portas of the CDS), who won 131 and 123 votes, respectively.

Thus the elections for the CSDN, CNP and CCS will have to be held again at tomorrow's plenary session, and it is thought in the Passos Perdidos that the PSD might consider the possibility of nominating Ourique Mendes (PSD deputy elected for the Azores) to replace Angelo Correia, and Nascimento Rodrigues for the presidency of the CNP, to replace Vaz Portugal. We report this with proper reservation, but this is how it was "leaked" to us by a social democratic source.

In the other votes held yesterday, the candidates who did not succeed in winning on the first balloting were elected by a simple majority: Vitor Dias to the Press Council, Helena Bruto da Costa to the Supervisory Board of the MAP [Portuguese Action Movement], and Vidigal Amaro to the Council of Europe. All three are PCP members.

## PS/PSD ALLIANCE, INTRAPARTY ACTIVITIES EXAMINED

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 20 Sep 83 p 2

[Commentary by Jose Miguel Judice: "Party Unanimity As of the Weekend"]

[Text] It even appeared that they had joined together. The three democratic parties had a joint meeting of their highest bodies between congresses this past weekend. At all of them the outcome was the same, decisions unanimously adopted, short discussions, seeming general cordiality--at least as far as the mass media could detect.

No one would be surprised that this was true in the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party]. In the opposition, and with leadership calmly accepted, with a cohesive and competent leadership team, the CDS cannot fail to be united, beyond the natural internal wars on very specific questions or the clashes of personal and other ambitions.

But with regard to the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and the PS [Socialist Party], one would probably expect a different situation, since the parties are in government office, the PS has an imminent congress, and there were some open questions in the PSD. Perhaps because of a difficult economic and financial situation in the country, perhaps because the government is still in a relative "state of grace," or perhaps because Mota Pinto and Soares acted intelligently at the meetings--what is certain is all went well and ended well.

But it cannot be concluded from this that these were meetings without a history or without political consequences. On the contrary, it is highly probable that these two meetings will be recalled if one day the history of the years which will follow is written. And perhaps 2 years from now, the situation will be explained on the basis of the recollection of these meetings.

## PSD: Political Polarization Beginning in 1985

Two or three weeks ago I voiced the question here, in an article on the PSD, about the meaning ascribed by the political leadership of the party to the coalition with the PS. I asked this question because I believed I was in a position to state that it was a very important issue for the members of that party, who would act consistent with the answers provided.



By chance, Mota Pinto made a clear statement 2 or 3 days later to the effect that the government was established because of a patriotic imperative, that it existed to resolve dramatic problems, and that this was no advance indication of or preparation for the party's loss of identity.

Therefore the meeting of the National Council was categorical. By stressing this interpretation in unchallengeable fashion, Mota Pinto established the conditions for a clear political outcome which will be very useful to him in the coming months. If there was a dominant tone at the National Council meeting, it was the desire for a party affirmation, insistence on the specificity and autonomy of the PSD, and clarification of the coalition and an agreement to resolve problems and not a marriage for life (or even for too long), a "civil union," to use the characteristic expression of a national leader.

This desire for affirmation takes shape, obviously, in many and varied ways and it has its origins in many and varied concerns. It is however an affirmation which, if the continuation of the coalition is not in question, would remain abstract and without sufficient precision, if not made explicit in terms of the presidential election.

The need for the proposal of Santana Lopes and Conceicao Monteiro, as council members elected at Montechoro on an autonomous slate, was in the opinion of those involved themselves a matter of clarification of this issue, above all, which remained open in the negotiations between the PS and the PSD. The importance of the National Council lies there, in the main. The fact is that Mota Pinto, in order to avoid for the National Council the delicate problem of voting on a mission which, in addition to that, included harsh criticisms of the secretary general in this connection, proposed a motion which asserted in an explicit way that the PSD should propose an autonomous party candidate for the presidency, one with a capacity to win.

The unanimity of this intention is a political fact of undeniable importance, because it means that the PSD is not abdicating its role as an alternative policy to the right in favor of the PS, which lies to its left. It means that the philosophy of converting the coalition with the PS into a government agreement and into a true federation of parties has lost out all along the line in the PSD. It means that the PSD has opted in clear fashion for political polarization for 1984, intending that the battle develop between a candidate supported by the PS and another supported by the PSD, and between their members, at least if we take the views which have been set forth by such men as Rebelo de Sousa, Nascimento Rodrigues and Eurico de Melo into account.

#### Capucho's Suffocating Affection

No great capacity for analysis or special acuteness will be needed to conclude that this development was due almost entirely to the famous interview with Capucho on the presidential election and other matters. Everything might have been different if the secretary general of the PSD had formally admitted committing an error, which would not have discredited him, because

Obviously no one is perfect. But his position, on the contrary, was to insist on the purposefulness of the statement about the almost certain victory of Mario Soares, thus proving the interpretation which was given, specifically on this page, correct.

If any doubt existed in this connection, it was banished by the statement of the National Commission of the PS, which was released at a time which did not even allow it to be reflected in the work of the National Council of the PSD. At a certain point it was written (this is reprinted from the JORNAL DE NOTICIAS) that "the timely nomination of its own candidate for the presidential election, in a desire to consolidate and expand the electoral space on which the PS/PSD coalition is based, thus contributes to its political strengthening."

The clarity of the assertion was such that only great haughtiness on the part of the PS, which the Capucho interview had certainly helped to create, could have allowed it. It is written there in black and white that the PS candidate will serve to broaden the electoral space of the coalition, that is not "only" that the PS candidate will also be the candidate of the PSD (at least in the second round), but further that the distinction between the two parties had diminished to the point that there is now talk of a common electoral space, even outside a preelectoral alliance!

It was against this risk that the opponents of the solution calling for government with the PS warned. And they did so in good time, because 100 days have barely passed as yet and already the PS is desirous of embracing the PSD with suffocating affection. And this is the risk which, since the National Council meeting of the PSD, has very definitely decreased. The PSD will continue to be faithful to the coalition, and the government was approved unanimously--with the votes of even those who opposed the solution as such, but no one can demand of it more than it promised. No one can demand of its members and its national and local leaders that they vote for a strategy which would lead to the annihilation of the PSD as an autonomous party and one with a legitimate ambition to recover its status as the first Portuguese party.

As he admitted 2 or 3 weeks ago, Mario Soares was the victim of Antonio Capucho's excessive zeal, to the point that with some naivete, one could almost conclude that the interview was a Machiavellian act on the part of the secretary general of the PSD to bring about the contrary of what was implicit in his statements.

#### An 18-Month Coalition

But to conclude all this, and one does not see how it is possible to conclude anything else, also means that in practice, the maximum time limit for the duration of the present government was set, and that is the date of the nomination of electoral candidates or, assuming an optimistic hypothesis, the day following that on which the future president of the republic is elected. In fact, the present coalition was, at least according to the interpretation of Prof Mota Pinto, unanimously approved by the National Council of the PSD, in an alliance between the two most important Portuguese parties, one on each

side--and thus it is called the central bloc--for the resolution of dramatic and urgent problems. The coalition exists for the 18-month emergency effort, and it exists for nothing else. Nor could it, since it would be perfectly surrealist for the two main candidates of the two allied parties to wage a campaign one against the other, while at the same time their supporters would continue to govern Portugal, as if it were nothing, as if the presidential electoral campaign were an event occurring in another dimension.

There are truly moments at which the seriousness of issues may become advantageous to a national unity government. It will be debatable whether this government was born on this supposition and whether everything was proper and acceptable at the beginning. I as a critic of the solution am not at all reluctant to admit that this solution had become the only one possible for the next 18 months, one within which the most intense political party conflict, which is naturally that occurring between the two greatest party forces, appears to be suspended.

This being the case, the present coalition is a stable solution and one well-based on the unanimous support of the parties involved in it, but it is a temporary solution for an exceptional period, and clearly limited as a function of a dated political event. And now one of two things must be true: either the government properly plays its role and then each of the parties, with the present leadership, will present itself to the strengthened electorate and one of them will win, or the government will play its role better, or the government will play its role badly, new political leaders will be stable, and probably each of the parties will lose a little or a lot to each of the smaller opposition parties. But what will be guaranteed is that each of the two parties will be autonomous and that they will likely be the major Portuguese political parties in 1985.

It will be said that it is necessary to have stability and that it will be excellent for a government to maintain it for 4 years. That is true in theory, but no one is to blame for the fact that the presidential elections will occur in 1985, and on the other hand, to think unrealistically sometimes means to lose the opportunity for what is possible. Reasoning of the type to which I have just referred would guarantee political unanimity within the government party. Any other possibility would have as its result, as the National Council of the PSD has implicitly suggested, a profound internal crisis within the PSD and the creation of an alternative to the present political leadership. Being in the present minority, I am sufficiently comfortable to sincerely hope, in the name of the national and the party interests, that all of the PSD national councils will adopt unanimous decisions between now and 1985.

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## PCP, OTHER OPPOSITION FORCES SEEN AS WEAK

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 19 Sep 83 p 4

[Commentary by Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa: "Lethargy in the Political Economic and Social Opposition"]

[Text] As usual, we are reprinting in full the report read into the microphones of Radio Renascenca yesterday on the program entitled "From Beginning to End," a news magazine carried by that broadcasting station every Saturday between 1300 and 1430 hours.

The PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] broke the silence it has maintained recently only to relapse speedily into that same silence, it seems. At the ANTE celebration, the secretary general, Dr Alvaro Cunhal, gave a long and apologetic address in which, first of all, the lack of conviction shown merits emphasis, as well as secondly, the appeal implicitly addressed to the president of the republic, Gen Ramalho Eanes, for the establishment of conditions which would favor the nomination of a candidate which the Communist Party could support for the 1985 presidential elections. Finally, Dr Alvaro Cunhal returned to the unacceptable idea that if new elections were held now, the parties winning the most votes in the last elections would be heavily penalized, deriving the inference therefrom that it will shortly be legitimate to ask that new general elections be convoked. It is time for a halt to this kind of speculation in our country, with the spectre or phantom of elections to be held or requested just a few months after the elections which have already been held.

In general it could be said that this intervention by the PCP in Portuguese political life had very little effect on public opinion, beginning with the mass media, in particular the appeal for the mobilization of the masses in connection with the economic and financial policy of the government. Perhaps because, first of all, many Portuguese citizens have now become accustomed to the inevitability of austerity, and then because the aggravation of the economic and financial situation will not necessarily facilitate movements guided by the transmission belts of the PCP, as the CGTP/IN [General Federation of Portuguese Workers/National Intersindical]. And finally, because if there is an outstanding characteristic at this time in Portugal, it is the lack of an opposition.

In 1983, and more concretely in this month of September, it could be said that there is a lethargy in the political, economic and social opposition in our country.

And this lethargy can result in a consequence dangerous to Portuguese democracy. This is the haughtiness of the government and the majority which supports it. Last week measures were announced for the most widely various sectors, which independent of their political timeliness and technical propriety, revealed a style of government haughtiness to a certain extent.

It should not be forgotten that the current prime minister, Dr Mario Soares, criticized the earlier governments for this same style, charging that they adopted an apparent superiority and self-satisfaction in connection with the other political, economic and social partners.

Would God that the current prime minister and the cabinet he heads can avoid lapsing into this dangerous sin--haughty conduct simply because of the fact that for the time being there is no visible opposition in Portugal.

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## PSD SEEN AS SUBORDINATE TO PS IN COMING ELECTION

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 19 Sep 83 p 3

[Editorial column entitled "Politics From A to Z: The Race for Belem"]

[Text] The work of the leading organs of the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD [Social Democratic Party] brought no surprises. In the Socialist Party, the "opposition" has adopted a flexible tactic. Vitor Constancio is not a waver of war; Francisco Zenha has moved apart; and Antonio Guterres is awaiting more favorable days. In the Socialist Democratic Party, Mota Pinto has seen his position as a leader consolidated, but the concern with preventing participation in the government from resulting in a diminution of the presence and the influence of the PPD [Popular Democratic Party]-PSD in the country can be glimpsed in its work.

The National Council meeting of the PSD approved a motion reflecting the state of mind of many of the "council members," and clearly urging the "need for a reassertion of the specific identity of the PSD in the coalition." The motion stressed that "the participation of the PSD in a coalition government does not prevent, but rather legitimizes, the strengthening of the assertion of its ideology and national base of support, engaging in political discourse and practice reflecting its autonomy." There is no desire, however, to cause "schisms" within the majority, but there is emphasis on the need, without prejudice "to the strengthening of one of the links in this chain" (the coalition allowing the PSD to participate in the government), to place "greater stress" on the assertion of the identity and the autonomy of the party.

The reader cannot fail to glimpse in these statements the concern of the PSD officials about the political subordination of the party. We know that this subordination has its compensations. However, the political image is determining in electoral behavior, for example. And the subordination of Mota Pinto to Mario Soares is a fact which must be borne in mind, not only with the political developments in the coming months in mind, but from the perspective of the presidential election.

The statements by Antonio Capucho, the powerful secretary general of the PSD and the calm minister for quality of life, pertaining to an almost inevitable triumph by Mario Soares in the 1985 presidential election, were discreetly discredited by the National Council of the PSD. Or rather, they were discredited as representing the strategy of the party, which at this distance does not invalidate the possibility that voting for the socialist candidate,

Mário Soares, has come to be the tactical formula chosen for this electoral participation by the PSD.

In fact, the position announced or at least accepted by Antonio Baptista would carry the subordination of Mota Pinto to Mário Soares, and of the PSD to the PS, even farther. Let it not be argued that the presidential authority is limited and that the presence of the president of the republic in national political life is a colorless one. The election of a member of the Socialist Party to the Belém post and the continuity of the socialist parliamentary group in a majority position in the Assembly of the Republic represent the undeniable subalternation of the Social Democratic Party. But more than that, the social democrats in the PSD, in view of the social democratization of the policy of the PS, and faced with the pressures from a seemingly liberal-oriented but old-fogeyish front, will tend to think that continuation in the PSD is not justified (after Sá Carneiro, and given the negative Francisco Balsemão experience). They will tend to believe that the time has come for the "unified Social Democratic Party."

For those who propose to maintain the PSD as an autonomous party, the assertion of the party's identity should, if it does not lead to a break in the "coalition," define a strategy safeguarding the national role of the PSD. Consistent with this goal, the National Council of the PSD confirmed the nomination of the Monteiro Congress, making the need for the PSD to have its own candidate in the presidential election explicit. This PSD candidacy, it was repeatedly emphasized, should "obviously be understood as the nomination of a candidate with the capacity to win the elections."

With the decision of the PSD to nominate "its own candidate," and if nominating this candidate is not a tactical maneuver, but rather he must be "a candidate with the capacity to win the elections," the foreseeable scenario for the presidential election appears overloaded with "candidates who can win the election." If we must accept that the same thing has been decided by the Socialist Party, and if we bear in mind the "candidate who can win the election" announced by Alvaro Cunhal at the speech he delivered at the AVANTE celebration, we will have to accept that there are three candidates "who can win the election."

It is not difficult to foresee that if the PSD nominates "a candidate who can win the election," and not forgetting that the CDS [Socialist Democratic Center Party] is also seeking its candidate, the electoral battle will in the end be waged between those who have defended the April events and the Constitution and those who have urged a "new constitutional revision" and the smooth or drastic liquidation of the April gains.

The government is likely to become isolated. The policy of the PS-PSD government will have inevitable electoral costs. These will be costs which neither a "PS candidate" or a "PSD candidate" can easily avoid. And this would be even more true for a candidate for the presidency of the republic who is a member of the cabinet responsible for a policy in connection with which the National Council of the PSD admitted that "it is urgent that the government alter its policy in relation to the citizens, and explain the

measures approved," among other things because "the continuation of the atmosphere of difficulty cannot be tolerated in the coming months."

Let it not be thought that we cling to the idea that we are doomed to "a static situation." Social dynamics may change the picture. But the PSD National Council meeting produced a new factor. The race for the Belem post is becoming more complicated.

5157

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## ENCRITICAL PRAISE OF UPCOMING MACHEL VISIT QUESTIONED

## Two Leaders Comment

Lisbon 0 DIA In Portuguese 21 Sep 83 p 13

[Text] The Mozambique News Agency reported statements by centrist president Lucas Pires and Marshal Costa Gomes concerning Samora Machel's imminent visit to Portugal.

According to Lucas Pires, this visit by the president of Mozambique is "historic" and "fundamental," among other things because in the "new history" which we are meant to pursue in all various ways at this time, it is important to round the Cape of Torments and to transform it into the Cape of Good Hope, and this time it must be in the opposite direction. And this," Lucas Pires said, "is the broader symbolic meaning of the visit."

In the opinion of Lucas Pires, Samora is "a historic personage in himself, a man with very great and very typical personal dimensions. He is not, therefore, the product of the post he holds. It is he who makes the post he holds what it is."

Costa Gomes believes that the visit comes within the context of the spirit which those "involved in the 25 April events" wanted to maintain, which involved "coordination and very close cooperation by Portugal with the Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa."

Lucas Pires added further that "more important than President Machel's ideology" are the links in cultural terms. The centrist leader concluded with the statement that he would like to see Machel establish contact during his visit with "the church, the armed forces, businesses, universities and an institution like the Gulbenkian Foundation."

## Pires Criticized

Lisbon 0 DIA In Portuguese 21 Sep 83 pp 1, 12

[Editorial: "A Gloomy 'Miracle'"]

[Text] Suddenly, at the end of the summer, we have a gloomy "miracle" and a boundless surprise: Lucas Pires and Costa Gomes join in praising the importance of the trip the dictator of Mozambique will make to Portugal.

No one, obviously, will be surprised that the marshal rejoices at the visit of his military counterpart and regular Moscow pilgrim. The same cannot be said, however, about the unconditional praise heaped by the Christian democratic leader on the visit by the president of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The least attentive citizen will be disturbed by the fact that Lucas Pires does not put any stress on the fact that the guest we will welcome lacks democratic legitimacy.

From a human and Christian viewpoint, one cannot understand the failure to express regret about the detention of Portuguese prisoners in the prisons of Mozambique, or the failure to criticize the sentences and penalties in the public square or streets to our compatriots and the people of Mozambique whom we left behind there on the pretext that we wanted them to be free.

One cannot understand how a unique opportunity for a reminder that the regime established in Maputo has still not been endorsed by a popular vote was wasted.

Can one imagine what our marshal and the centrist leader would say if asked about a hypothetical visit by Pinochet? The defense of the most elementary human rights is not consistent with special friendships or political or economic interests. A man is always a man in all his physical, social and moral dimensions, in whatever clime he lives: he must suffer and he must die.

If we continue to scatter flowers and voice hosannas in these days remaining until Samora Machel sets foot on the territory of the builders of his country, he will arrive here and there will be no more need to ask the Portuguese ministers, as has been done thus far: "But who after all commands in Portugal?"

In view of the level of his frankness and derangement in dialogue, it would not be surprising if he came here to say to us: "Brothers and comrades, the time has come to think and act like this comrade of yours!"

The smile with which the dignitaries will probably respond will be a screen for the revulsion of the citizens.

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## HASI CONGRESS ENDS ON PRO-ETA, ANTI-SECURITY NOTE

Madrid EI ALCAZAR In Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 9

[Text] The combination meeting and party that brought to a close on Sunday the Congress of the HASI [Revolutionary People's Socialist Party] Party, formed in the Herri Batasuna coalition, turned into a separatist act of exaltation of the ETA terrorist organization and a rebuff for the Security Forces of the State.

In fact, the interventions of the secretary general, Txomin Ziluaga, and the chairman of the party, Santi Brouard, were several times interrupted by shouts of support for the independence of "Euzkadi," in favor of ETA, against the National Police and the Civil Guard. Then there were slogans and rallying cries requesting freedom for jailed ETA members.

The congress was held in the pelota court of Renteria, presided over by a big, red poster against which the emblems of HASI, KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] and "Ikurrina" stood out. Together with the poster, were the flags and anagrams of the organizations that make up the "alternative KAS" (Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista) and those of the invited organizations of an independent kind, like the UPG (Galician) and IPC (Catalan).

The most debated paper, reports EUROPA PRESS, was the one on politics in which the "alternative KAS" is recognized, as a leading "bloc leader of the Basque Revolutionary process, within which HASI is trying to do a job described in the mottoes: Develop the party, strengthen the bloc and advance on the road to popular unity." It should be noted that the "alternative KAS" is supported by the ETA terrorist organization, and that its fundamental points are: the independence of "Euzkadi," amnesty, emergence of the POP and recognition of "euskera" as a priority language.

In this sense, HASI believes that "the valid political posture in the Basque Provinces is that defended in the "alternative KAS," which is enjoying popularity, contrary to the channel of the Statute of Guernica, which is blocked.

The HASI Congress also received greetings from revolutionary organizations from South America, as well as from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In them, recognition is made "of the struggle in pursuit of the unsettled claims of the Basque working people."

Ailuaga indicated that "we have acquired big responsibilities, as our motto shows: building the party, strengthening the KAS bloc, and going forward with Herri Batasuna--popular unity," as is reported in the daily EGIN. He also referred to the Sandinist National Liberation Front of Nicaragua, which was represented in the first HASI Congress, now the Salvadoran guerrilla warfare. "Our wish is for the Salvadoran comrades to advance on the road to victory."

Before the congress was brought to a close singing the "Internationale" in the Basque language, the chairman of HASI, Santi Brouard, stated--adds EGIN-- "We want to reassert ourselves in revolutionary militancy as the only way to victory: in addition, we have to make today's impossibility turn into tomorrow's possibility."

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## CATALAN SOCIALISTS PUSH TO ALTER PUJOL 'CONSERVATISM'

Madrid ABC in Spanish 27 Sep 83 p 26

[Text] Barcelona--The Catalan Socialists are preparing a series of studies for the creation of a future socialist Generalidad. With this goal in mind, the association Catalana y Futur has been created--headed by Roman Gubern--to define the main points leading toward a change from Pujol's present "conservative policy" to an autonomic, progressive government. During the discussion on general policy which begins today in the autonomous parliament, the PSC-PsOE [Party of the Socialists of Catalonia] will launch a general criticism against Jordi Pujol's performance which, hopefully will be the prologue to the electoral campaign for Catalanian elections.

Nearly 100 intellectuals belonging to the recently constituted Catalonia and y Futur will prepare a series of studies for a future socialist Generalidad, as Roman Gubern declared publicly.

"We, the current Generalidad, think that it has a conservative policy and we, still maintaining our political independence, intend to influence any future, autonomic, progressive government," said the professor and provisional chairman of this Association. He also gave assurances several times that "we are not a political party or a group that aspires to assume power; the material which is being prepared and worked on will be presented to any progressive political option."

The immediate objectives of the organization will be open debates on broad subjects and the will to write a white book on them before the upcoming autonomic elections. Five large groups of subjects have now been made up around the economic crisis and alternatives, territory and environment, culture, youth and health and quality of life.

## Precedents

The constitution of this association is the continuation of the manifesto "Now for change" that the same intellectuals drew up in support of the socialist list of candidates to the past general elections.

The current manifesto states among other things, that "In this difficult time of pursuing identities, the Catalan territorial triangle, a Latin bridge

between the French, Italian and Castilian cultures, can perform a crucial role in offering a progressive, Mediterranean cultural alternative."

The secretary of the association is Dr Carlos Sanpons, and the managing committee is made up of Antonio Aponte, Jose Maria Castellet, Katy Carreras, Alberto Esquerdo, Jordi Font, Jose Maria Forn, Jose Antonio Gonzalez Casanova, Jose Maria Riera, Raimon Obiols, Albert Rafols and others.

#### Towards the Elections

In addition, today marks the start in the Catalan Parliament of what will probably be the last debate before the upcoming autonomic elections. Jordi Pujol will submit a balance sheet of the accomplishments of this session of the legislature by the government. An issue that the main opposition party, that of the Socialists of Catalonia, will try to keep away from to put the debate on the right track towards leading policy issues.

The Socialists, just as they have been assuming for the past few months, will criticize the statements and proposals of the government for the institutionalization of Catalonia since, according to the PSC, Jordi Pujol and his government "wished to confuse public opinion to make it understood that the Generalidad is equal to Convergence and Union."

This appropriation of Catalonia--stated members of the Socialist leadership--"has done harm to the real integration of many sectors of society."

Then again, the PSC believes that Jordi Pujol's policy has been isolationist, a posture which has not allowed him to defend the interests of Catalonia.

Republican Left believes that the debate should start with a balanced exposition made by the president of the Generalidad, in order to later work out three points which for this party are essential.

These issues are: considerations regarding the establishment of institutions in Catalonia, linguistic normalization and balance in the economic crisis, as well as the scope of the measures which the government of the Generalidad has adopted to combat it.

The PSUC also agrees on this last. Its secretary general, Antonio Gutierrez Diaz, has stated that the fight against unemployment should not be the exclusive concern of the councillor of labor, but of the whole government, which must think of comprehensive measures. "The good will of one councillor," said Gutierrez Diaz, "is not enough."

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## EUROPEAN SUBMARINE SALES OFFERS TO AUSTRALIA

Stuttgart MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Jun 83 pp 264-268

[Article by A.W. Grazebrook, an Australian naval expert and reserve officer providing a survey of the current status of the Royal Australian Navy's plans for its new submarine generation; translator: Friedrich Forstmeier.]

[Text] Early in 1982, the RAN (Royal Australian Navy) set up a directing staff for a new submarine project in the Defense Bureau's navy office in Canberra. It is the task of the project directing staff to develop a plan to replace or supplement the present Australian submarine forces for the time when they will have reached the limit of their maintenance during the nineties.

The present Australian submarine fleet consists of 6 vessels built in Scottish shipyards whose ship's hulls and propulsion aggregates initially were nearly identical with the Oberon class ships of the British, Chilean, Brazilian, and Canadian navies. HMAS Oxley, the first Australian submarine, was put in service in 1967; three sister ships--Otway, Ovens, and Onslow--were added by the end of the year. Two additional submarines, HMAS Orion and HMAS Otama, started service in the fleet in 1977 and 1978, respectively.

The first ship was drydocked at the Cockatoo Shipyard in Sidney in 1977 for "half-time modernization." In doing so, not only the ship's hull and machine installations were reconditioned but also the so-called SWUPS (sensor and weapons update program), in other words a modernization program for submarine armament and sensors was performed. In detail:

--Installation of the Operations and launching systems for Mark-48-Mod-8 torpedoes;

--Installation of launching and control systems for "Harpoon" missiles carried in containers;



--Installation of the German (SU 3-41 Krupp-Atlas attack sonar system).

--Installation of the SFCS-RAN-MK1 Mod 0 Singer-Librascope fire control system;

--Installation of the Sperry-Micropuff passive sonar.

HMAS Oxley, the first ship of the above-mentioned Oberon class, presumably will reach its "age limit" in the early nineties. Therefore, the RAN two years ago started to formulate the military requirements for the second generation of Australian submarines. This task was assigned to the director of submarine policy in the navy office of the defense ministry. Details of the result of his preparatory work and preliminary considerations have not been announced. But from the knowledge of RAN routine procedure in similar cases and some hints that have leaked out through industrial circles, it can be concluded that the weaponry of the new submarine generation will include at least Mark-48 torpedo versions. Accordingly it is likely that the sensors will be adapted to these two main weapons systems.

Moreover, the RAN military requirement as regards endurance of ships at sea will take into account the great distances that must be covered with in missions in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Our readers know that adequate endurance at sea includes more than only sufficient fuel supplies. To this must be added an appropriate supply of ammunition, rations, spareparts, and crew quarters. Perhaps on the basis of these general considerations, experts in the field believe that the RAN military requirement boils down to demanding for the new submarine generation a type larger than the diesel-electric submarines now being planned or built by other Western navies.

To test the supply, the RAN asked submarine construction yards to submit proposals for the design and construction of new submarines for Australia.

This request also considered construction programs providing for the building of a prototype ship and perhaps one or two subsequent ships at overseas shipyards; but a certain number of them will always be built in Australia.

Seven firms responded: Kockums (Sweden), Nevesbu (The Netherlands), DTICN (France), Howaldt-Deutsche Werft (FRG), Thyssen-Nordseewerke (FRG), Vickers (Great Britain), and Italcantieri (Italy).

Sweden offered its type 47, a 56 meter long 1900-ton submarine. Apart from the good characteristics attributed by all firms to their ships--greater diving depth, longer endurance at sea, good maneuverability at every speed--the Swedish firm of Kockums describes its ship as a "new concept--a conventional submarine that possesses an air-independent propulsion system."

Information on detailed data was rejected but according to reports the submarine is said to be able to prolong its operation time in diving condition without supply of fresh air for a considerable time. This reduces the vital snorkel or surfacing times in which the submarine can be more easily picked up by enemy sensors.

However, the Swedish offer has two disadvantages. First of all, the attempt by a former Swedish government should be recalled to hinder the commitment of Australian armed forces in Vietnam by restricting the resupply of military gear for weapons that had originally been bought by Australia in Sweden. True that was more than a decade ago, Sweden's attitude at that time remains a vivid memory to the planners responsible for Australia's defense.

The second drawback of the Swedish offer consists in the fact that it is a model that has not yet been tested and proven in service, a fact of extraordinary importance to the Australians. As already mentioned, the Swedish type 47 is untested and moreover considerably bigger than all submarines thus far built by Kockums or put in service by the Swedish navy.

Neither the Swedes nor the Dutch who responded to the Australian query have experience in carrying out a joint construction program in which the country of the shipbuilder cooperates with the ordering country based on division of labor.

But the Dutch enjoy an excellent reputation as designers and builders of good ocean-going submarines. They have a matured 2100-ton submarine design (Walrus class) equipped with a sensor and fire control system to handle the Mark 48 torpedo and the "Harpoon" missile carried in containers, both of which are to be procured according to the wishes of the Australian naval command. Furthermore, the Dutch shipbuilders are stressing that their submarines have achieved greater diving depths than the units of former submarine generations and possess a considerably greater radius of action. In addition, the Walrus class submarines will have their sea tests behind them by the time the RAN must make a decision on the type finally to be selected. The construction planning of the Dutch--present plans call for the construction of four units for the Royal Dutch Navy and of

two orders for Taiwan—would make it possible to build in time an Australian prototype ship in the Netherlands.

DTN, the French firm, offered a version of the Agosta class. According to reports, this type does not meet the military requirements specified by the RAN. Moreover, the design is already several years old, the submarine is smaller than the Australian Oberon class units and much smaller than the size for submarines envisaged by the RAN for the nineties.

DTN is said to be in the process of submitting a new offer that meets the RAN military requirements. On the other hand, it must be considered that DTN possesses the technical know-how for cooperation with non-European firms (for example, with Bazan, Astagena, for the Royal Spanish Navy). At present it is gathering additional experience through cooperation with Vickers Dockyard in the construction of HMAS Success, the new RAN tanker. Vickers Dockyard in Sidney is being considered as domestic construction yard for the construction of the new submarine generation.

The German Howaldtswerke is offering its type 2000. On account of its success in building modern diesel-electric submarines, this shipyard has more than just a good reputation. It sells these submarines not only to the FRG navy but also to numerous foreign navies. This includes the transmittal of technological know-how in submarine building, as is the case especially concerning Turkey, India, and Brazil. Only few details are known concerning the design characteristics of the type 2000 considered for the RAN. The ship has 8 torpedo tubes, four of which can also be used for "Harpoon" missiles.

According to unconfirmed but reliable information, the designer of type 2000—IKL—states that the manhours required for the construction of the ship is about one million. This considerably undercuts the number mentioned by competing firms, which goes as high as 4 million manhours.

Calculation of the manhours required for submarine construction partly depends on the work of the subcontractors although the number of their manhours normally is not a component of the shipyard calculation. But the required number of manhours will be a quite significant factor in the construction of the new Australian RAN submarines, above all because of the very high Australian wage costs.

The Thyssen-Nordseewerke has decided the competition for the construction of Argentinean submarines in its favor with their type TR 1700. The ships of this shipyard will have already

proved themselves at the time of the RAN decision making. In the somewhat larger version of the IR-1700A, they will have the right size and layout according to the RAN concepts.

With a standard displacement of about 1800 tons, six torpedo tubes, and a 39-man crew, type IR 1700, especially as regards crew strength, is very economical compared with other (though not all) competitors. INSW gives the assurance that the 39-man crew will suffice to operate the ship in the three-watch rotation. Calculated over the life of the ship, this means that the construction costs for two ships of this type can be saved in crew costs. The shipyard further points out that the four ship's generators have such a high energy output that the surfaced or surfacing time is correspondingly greatly reduced. The listed underwater maximum speed of the IR 1700--about 25 knots--is the highest speed of a ship of comparable type that the author was able to find in the literature on the subject.

The type 1100 is offered by the Italian shipyard Italcantieri and has some drawbacks as the French Agosta type; the Sauro type originally goes back to a design of the late sixties. Furthermore, the Italian type was designed primarily for deployment in the Mediterranean. Optimizing the ship's characteristics for this sea area requires best possible operational capability of the units in relatively shallow and narrow waters. Australian submarines, however, for the most part must operate in entirely different sea areas. To take this factor into account, the shipyard apparently has developed a "stretched" Sauro type of 1834 t standard displacement (the regular Sauro type: 1456 tons).

Therefore, even though type 1100 appears to hold little attraction for the RAN compared with other offers, it should be taken into account that Italcantieri has a great deal of experience in the construction of diesel electric ships and can point out that the smaller half-sisters of type 1100 have fully proved their worth in deployment at sea.

The Italian shipbuilders do not have any experience in cooperating with non-Italian shipyards in carrying out construction programs, but they have been able to sell a considerable number of surface ships to other countries. At present they are testing cooperation with Peruvian shipyards within the framework of a frigate construction program. Moreover, they have closely cooperated with RAN procurement agencies, such as, for example, in the preparation of a bid for an aircraft carrier of the Italian Garibaldi type.

The British Vickers shipyard offered a new version of its

diesel-electric type 2400 to the RAN. Vickers put its immense experience in submarine construction into the type 2400. Even though Vickers (Shipbuilding) Limited has now been incorporated into British Shipbuilders, the relations with Vickers Cockatoo in Sydney based on long-standing general and technical exchange would be a considerable advantage if Vickers were enlisted by the RAN concerning the Australian new construction program for submarines.

The offered type, with an underwater displacement of 2400 tons, is bigger than the competing Swedish and Italian designs.

While it is likely that the type 2400 can incorporate without difficulty the planned "Harpoon" missiles, construction changes would presumably have to be made for the installation of Mark 48 torpedoes. What is also important is the crew strength of 48, which is bigger than that of the competing types.

Since a short time ago, Australia has been carefully following the role the British could play in the implementation of the new submarine program, especially by taking into account the domestic industry.

#### The Two German Offers

The two German offers are likely to be considered for closer examination for the Australian submarine program: type 2000 by IKL/HDW and the new version of the TR-1700 by the Thyssen-Nordseewerke, the somewhat bigger TR-1700A. The MARINE RUNDSCHAU editors have summarized some technical data of the two types of submarines in the table below.

Characteristics		TNSW TR-1700A	IKL/HDW Type 2000
Length overall	m	70	67.3
Width	m	7.5	7.75
Draft	m	6.6	6.9
Height over all	m		13.3
Standard displacement	ts	ca. 2000	2083
Surface displacement	t	ca. 2250	
Crew		ca. 30	33
Speed, submerged	kn	ca. 23.5	25
Speed, snorkel	kn	ca. 14	
Speed, surfaced	kn	ca. 10/12	



INSW  
TR-1700A

IFL/HDW  
Type 2000

# Propulsion Facility

Propeller		1	1
fraction motor	kw		7300
Diesel generators	kw		48856
Batteries	cells		8X120

## Armament

Torpedo tubes		6	8
Reserve		20 <sup>1</sup>	18 <sup>2</sup>

1. Torpedoes or missiles

2. or 4 torpedoes with 4 "narpoes"

British Shipbuilders addressed a letter to a number of industrial corporations in various parts of Australia with the request to provide an opportunity for a very high member of its board of directors to discuss cooperation with representatives of Australia's industry. But careful readers of the letter pointed out that it spoke of the "potential for the assembly of submarines," while the RAN has greater expectations concerning cooperation than were assembly of submarines in Australia.

Comptroller representatives of the navy and industry emphasize that the Australians can do much more than the relatively simple assembly of ships and that the implementation of the submarine program is being viewed under the ambitious but nonetheless realistic aspect to abandon the original plan according to which up to half of the new ships were to be built in non-Australian shipyards. It is being pointed out that Turkey, India, and Argentina are building submarines in their domestic shipyards following (and) providing for nothing more than the building of a prototype ship in Germany, but the building of the subsequent ships in their domestic shipyards.

The opinion is being advocated that the establishment of a separate new enterprise for submarine construction at a sizable distance from the traditional shipbuilding firms will make possible the establishment of a shipyard that can devote itself optimally to the construction of modern diesel-electric submarines and eventually with increased aid tied to the traditionally established norms of the shipbuilding craft.

being without the very valuable experiences acquired by Vickers Limited during the modernization program of the RAN Oberon class ships would be added to the cost resulting from the establishment of this new shipyard. The forces advocating abandonment of the old practice of accepting British master builders and methods are growing within the RAN.

When the RAN submarine squadron was formed 15 years ago, all senior officers favored transfers from the Royal Navy. These officers performed excellent buildup work and achieved a generally respected level of squadron training. Since they also developed the SWUPS, they proved that they are quite capable of dispensing with British weapons and sensors if this serves RAN interests better.

The last officers of this category are close to retirement. The first graduate of the RAN college, who, as a submarine specialist, in the meantime achieved the rank of captain, has been appointed director of submarine policy and an officer born in Australia has become director of the planning staff for new construction submarine projects.

Therefore it is unlikely that the British will receive favored treatment in the awarding of the contract. A decisive criterion will be the suitability of the type to be chosen for its intended mission, its fitness for deployment at sea and the possibility as well as the cost/benefit ratio in the construction at Australian shipyards.

Details of the probable cost have not been announced and the figures being circulated must be accepted with caution. Therefore it is difficult for every author to state which of the proposed types has the best prospects. However, it can be assumed that the ships (or ship versions) of the following firms fit on the list for further consideration:

- The Design-Navalwerke with the IR 1000;
- Damen (the Netherlands) with Walrus;
- Vickers (Great Britain) with type 2400; and
- Royal-Danish-Werft with type 2000.

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## SWISS COMMENT ON FRENCH RAPID ACTION FORCE MANEUVERS

Zürich: NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG, in German 1 Oct 53 p 4

[Article by Ch. M. Etain: "Dezels and Reality of French 'Blitz' Force"]

[Text] As part of its regular autumn maneuvers, I Corps of the French Army had the distinct air of presenting the nucleus of a new airmobile division which is to represent the core of the future FAR (Rapid Action Force). The exercise was staged between Langres and Verdun with two actions by a "lightning force" consisting mostly of helicopters; in spite of the rather clever display, this presentation, if anything, strengthened the suspicion that attention was to be diverted from an actual reduction in French Army strength with the help of some kind of modernistic stage play.

## Unrealistic Combat Scenes

The high point of the maneuvers with the "lightning force"--to which rather characteristically neither foreign military attaches, nor the members of the National Assembly's defense committee had been invited--basically consisted of nothing more than a presentation of the 1st and 3rd helicopter regiments as well as elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment, all of which together had so far been standing by for just this kind of tactical mission within I Corps. But this unit--which has now been elevated to the status of the experimental brigade of the future 4th Airmobile Division in Nancy--was not tested during these maneuvers as a rapid deployment unit to be used over long distances; only a presumed case of departure was indicated in the Orleans area for exercise purposes. There were likewise no reference points either for the idea that the "lightning force" so far has really been practicing hard for the type of operations for which it has been earmarked.

In spite of the extremely telegraphic "presentation" of precisely lined-up helicopter flight formations with their searchlights on--rather reminiscent of sequences from the movie "Apocalypse Now" minus Wagnerian tunes--with which the Airmobile Division and at the same time the entire "Rapid Action Force" were hawked via television as if they were already a reality, the entire concept for the time being exists merely on paper and not in fact. In the tactical and technical context of the presentation alone it was clear that the French Army is far from having the required modern equipment for attack helicopter regiments. But whatever there exists of all this at this time is by far not being ordered in the necessary volume. Tanks and AT helos are obsolete. A heroic

and helicopter attack with a "combat jump" from their Gazelle helicopters in front of an IIR force in the forward line, even at least with the "downing" of two of those martial aircraft, indicated by red smoke. Other combat aircraft were obviously seeking to realize a probable battlefield change. There was no sense a sketchy indication of the extremely difficult cooperation between AT helicopters and ground units, captained by daringly few infantrymen with MIAM AT vehicles in old jeeps. The flames and cracking of primitive ammunition constituted the spectacular fireworks backdrop of the entire affair.

There is supply infrastructure.

There is substantially much in the future organizational structure and action capacity of the future airborne division and in the entire "rapid action force" that is still shrouded in uncertainty. The three or four helicopter regiments for the 4th Airborne Division (11-14th) are not being constituted with the help of helio aircraft and have been assigned to the corps. But we have already clearly sensed that this is precisely what will happen. Furthermore, the employment of the "lightning force" alone—in other words, the present-day hall of the future division—would require about 60 flights with one transport aircraft over the advertised 250 kilometers in one forward sweep and that would require 15-20 of such aircraft. That represents roughly half of the present-day transport aircraft inventory of the French Air Force. It would be needed alone for supplying the force. The operational staff of a single infantry company with jeeps and MIAM AT vehicles over that same distance required 15 times transport helicopters, that is to say, about one-third of the presently available number of that type of helicopter.

There are references also to the problems connected with a real "fire brigade" —one of our well-known ones—right upon the situation in the way of unity of operations on a larger scale. They simply do not have the transport capacity for this sort of commitment—and no decisive remedies have been proposed to overcome serious problems. Before Minister Bernier last summer admitted that the employment of the future 5th Airborne Division in the operations to the French defense deployment would not be feasible without serious logistic support from the NATO allies, that is to say, from America. That is to say, the employment of the future 5th Airborne Division in the operations to the French defense deployment would not be feasible without serious logistic support from the NATO allies, that is to say, from America. That is to say, the employment of the future 5th Airborne Division in the operations to the French defense deployment would not be feasible without serious logistic support from the NATO allies, that is to say, from America.

From "Rapid Action Force" to "Lightning Force"

The 5th Airborne Division (11-14th) will have an adequate transport capacity for the employment of the future airborne division. It follows from this that the 5th Airborne Division will have a number of mounting a well equipped for the entire "rapid action force" which is supposed to be formed by three main elements including the 5th Airborne Division. The organizational structure of the 5th Airborne Division is not yet clear, but it is likely that the 5th Airborne Division will have a number of mounting a well equipped for the entire "rapid action force" which is supposed to be formed by three main elements including the 5th Airborne Division.

highly mobile, fast-moving, elite expeditionary corps of five divisions with 15,000 men. This is also a diversifying measure with which the reactivation of two armored and two infantry divisions is to be connected. Following this reworking of the conventional army, especially I Corps, there will of course again be somewhat larger divisions--with equipment and manpower from the units to be deactivated being distributed over the remaining units--whereby two different types of armored divisions are to be created. Overall, the remnant of the army, which is not to be assigned to the FAR, will lose mobility while the mobility of the FAR is by far not sufficient for the situation it is supposed to have. The left-wing administration so far has managed astonishingly well in keeping the public and the generals likewise happy with clever FAR propaganda--except, of course, for the prematurely retired army generals Delamare and Bonnet. Even the opposition can hardly get anyone's attention for its arguments, no matter how sarcastically. Gaullist defense expert Lucien Saint compare the FAR with the rabbit that the magician pulls out of his hat, the idea being that public attention is to be diverted from the financial gap in the nation's defense effort. From the "Big Silence" or the "Great Illusion" this is a rather pressing question in view of the budgetary blow on the battlefield at Verdun.

END

1960 10/07/10



## KONGSBERG ARMS PLANT'S STRUCTURE, DEVELOPMENT PLANS OUTLINED

From WEHRTECHNIK in German Sep 83 pp 96-101

[Interview of Rolf Øverlid, president of the Kongsberg Arms Plant, Jens Ch. Width, director of the company division for military technology, Sven Oederud, project director for submarine control systems, Jan E. Andersen, director of the division for product information, and Kjell Ellingsen, director of the Kongsberg bureau in Bonn, in Kongsberg, by WEHRTECHNIK: "Ready to Cooperate"; date of interview not given]

[Text] The German-Norwegian arms cooperation agreement resulted in renewed German-Norwegian cooperation in the submarine sector. In this connection it came as a general surprise in Germany that the Norwegian firm A/S Kongsberg Vapenfabrikk was selected as the general contractor for the basic control and weapon delivery system to be used in German and Norwegian submarines. A newcomer in this sector? No, for the company has for more than 70 years been active in the fire control and control system sector. In addition the antiship missile REMUM is being manufactured by Kongsberg and is being developed into an air-to-ship version. Likewise new proximity fuzes are in an advanced stage of development. The following interview with Kongsberg-president Rolf Øverlid, the director of the company division for military technology, Jens Ch. Width, the project director for submarine control systems, Sven Oederud, the director of the division for product information, Jan E. Andersen, as well as the director of the Kongsberg bureau in Bonn, Kjell Ellingsen, in Kongsberg near Oslo shows how the activities of the company during the past 70 years have considerably developed in the direction of higher technology. Special characteristic: The company is open to all types of cooperation in Europe.

WEHRTECHNIK: Your company is a firm which belongs to the Norwegian state and is run as a private enterprise. But did it not have its origin in an arsenal of the Norwegian armed forces?

Øverlid: Our history as an arms plant therefore also the name A/S Kongsberg

responsibilities, which have been retained until today--reaches back to the beginning of the previous century when, after the closing of the silver mines, on the basis of machine tool manufacture, we began with the production of small arms in 1915. Five years later we became an arsenal of the army--and we were closed in this capacity until 1947. At the beginning of the century, the manufacture of artillery weapons was added, after the First World War the first civilian products were included on a small scale. In 1947 the arsenal was reorganized and we became a firm under the direction of the Ministry of Defense until in 1958, after the second reorganization, we became a corporation subordinated to the Ministry of Industry, with the Norwegian state as the sole owner. Now, then, to state the chief difference between Fongsberg and a private firm: the Norwegian Parliament must agree to an increase of our capital stock.

QUESTIONER: To what extent do civilian products have a share in your turnover today?

ANSWER: In 1958 we entered civilian manufacture on a broad scale, which today amounts between 60 and 70 percent of our turnover--during the past year civilian manufacture amounted for as much as 1,650 million Nkr of a total turnover of 2,000 million Nkr, while the company division for military technology produced 350 million Nkr.

QUESTIONER: You have a total of 7 company divisions, two questions about this: one, how do you divide the company divisions and why are there 7 company divisions? One suggestion, on the one hand, the company division for gas turbines, on the other, the company division for jet engine components?

ANSWER: The company divisions are independent profit centers, but there is very close cooperation between them, which also has to do with the fact that, on technical reasons, the company division for military technology has by far the most sophisticated equipment. There is also a personnel exchange between the company divisions. Every company division, however, has the facilities which it needs to cover its needs: Marketing, development and sales. And now to the second part of your question: The company division for gas turbines originally produced what is known as average radial flow turbines, which were also very much in demand as gas turbine units for the propulsion of the engine components--for example, as manufacturers for the propulsion system of the F-16. This means that because of the different markets, actually not many points of contact--and, however, still share with the next generation of gas turbines, in particular as regards the production technology.

QUESTIONER: Did you build up the civilian company divisions yourself or were they purchased?

ANSWER: With the exception of some small firms, which were incorporated in the company, we created all company divisions ourselves.

QUESTIONER: Your company division for military technology is concentrated on the F-16, is that correct?

ANSWER: Yes, in Fongsberg we not only have the heart of our enterprise, but also

the center of the nation first, which were had a total of approximately 1,000 employees. We now have here about 1,500 employees, but in addition we also have plants in Narvik for mechanical and electronic products, a maintenance center for the Norwegian weapons stationed in North-Norway is also planned there. In addition a plant for civilian gas turbine parts and various mechanical parts, as well as a small plant in Onden for production machine tools.

OSWALD: Looking at a whole also has approximately 20 business establishments, mostly for services and sales for civilian gas turbines and electronics. The only assembly plants outside of Norway are in Maldenhead in Great Britain for data systems, and in Houston, Texas, for gas turbines.

OSWALD: How high is the export share in the company division for military technology?

WILHE: These, by default, our entire F-16 business belongs to export, the export share with about 80 percent is very high. Without the F-16, it would amount to approximately 30 to 40 percent through the exports of fuzes and PEN-UMIN-UMIN-UMIN to Sweden, Greece and Turkey and this far only for testing purposes the United States.

OSWALD: Do you also generally see the possibility to arrive at development and production cooperation with the United States?

WILHE: This will be very difficult, in particular if there is to be a genuine two-way street. We are prepared to supply available products—here I would have like to mention PEN-UMIN-UMIN if the U.S. forces have a corresponding demand.

OSWALD: Some years ago, Germany probably was a good customer, now there is no hope for further good cooperation.

WILHE: During the 1960's the German forces were our best customers next to the Norwegian forces, in particular in the sphere of army ordnance. Thus we supplied to the German forces the gun mounts for all 20-millimeter. When we had further developed on the basis of a license from Hispano-Suiza the gun mounts for the VERA (not further identified), too, comes from us. Likewise we manufactured approximately 100,000 G-3 guns for the federal armed forces and later supplied parts to Heckler & Koch, and we also produced the M70 counter velocity fuse developed by our firm, for the 120-millimeter mortar of the federal armed forces. Through these and other orders, we were able to expand our own production facilities. During the 1970's the relations with Germany became cooler, indeed almost dried up with respect to deliveries. Since 1973, there were political reasons for this, since in 1973 we had decided against membership in the European Economic Community. However, we found other customers, in particular through our participation in the F-16 program, in Greece and I would also like to mention Sweden and Finland. The relationship to Sweden grew increasingly strong in the late 1970's and the same is true of Canada, also in connection with French wishes to receive more from Norway.

OSWALD: Do you have already and have more cooperation agreements with some NATO countries?

WILHELM: Yes. We have appropriate agreements with France, Canada, the United States, and a lot for reaching one with Germany—agreements with Sweden and Great Britain should likewise follow soon. In the agreement between Germany and Norway product spheres were stipulated which, to begin with, are to be investigated on a priority basis in regard to possible cooperation. The relationship to Germany—this I would like to emphasize once more—is not only important for our firm in regard to sales but also in a political sense. We need some solid Norwegian-German and/or European projects.

FRANKMILLER: How successful have you been with respect to cooperation with other countries?

WILHELM: For a beginning we are quite satisfied in this regard. Let us take the cooperation between Norway and Sweden. Both armed forces have agreed on close cooperation in order to arrive, in the course of new development, at products which equally meet the requirements of both armed forces. Thus, for example, we supply the PENGUIN anti-air missiles for the Swedish fast patrol boats of the 300A class. For the engine firms Suresa in France and Rolls Royce in Great Britain we manufacture engine components, and we supply certain helicopter components to Westland.


FRANKMILLER: Do you see the possibility of arriving at new joint German-Norwegian army projects, now that cooperation in the submarine sector has been finally established?

WILHELM: I hope that the cooperation with Germany, now newly underway, will go beyond the Navy. In my view, Norway can offer good experience, in particular as now we are forced, on account of the limited amount of money available, to build single systems, just think, for example, of our combat-efficient, but very small fast patrol boats. The same also applies to PENGUIN as a rather expensive solution compared to other missiles. We also have a great deal of experience with respect to the effect of the harsh climate on weapons. While we have only a small industry in Norway, it is very specialized and needs a large export.

FRANKMILLER: You already mentioned your participation in the F-16 program. At what value is this program for you and what do you produce?

WILHELM: All together, the F-16 program has a turnover value for us in avionic of approximately 1.5 billion Nkr and employs about 260 staff members. Our component production for the F-16 jet engine has the same value. Our participation in this program is motivated in the fact that we were able to modernize our factory facilities with considerably larger investments, and not only in the production sector, but also in the testing systems and maintenance systems.

For the F-16 we manufacture the third and fourth turbine stage, in the Avionics the inertial navigation system in license from Singer-Rheinfurt. Now that the U.S. Air Force has selected an inertial navigation system by Litton as a standard system, we will manufacture it, too. The F-16 program also includes the Storm Management Set, that is the computer-assisted installation



Key:

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Management                        | 15. Brakes and brake components. Clutch boosters. Driving axles.   |
| 2. H. Overnild, President            | 16. Mobile and stationary gas turbines, mainly for the production of electricity, in the power range of kilovolt-ampere.   |
| 3. R. E. Rolfsen, Vice-President     | 17. Interactive graphic systems for drafting and for construction. High-performance precision drafting machines.   |
| 4. O. S. Lokholm, Vice-President     | 18. Ship automation. Dynamic positioning. Gyro systems. Autopilots. Navigation systems.  |
| 5. O. Pjell, Director of Finance     | 19. Underwater control systems. Riser systems. Process control. Underwater engineering and installation. Off-shore service.  |
| 6. Central Divisions                 | 20. Engine modules and components, among other things for the F-16.  |
| 7. Company Divisions                 | 21. Guns. Mounts and cannons in the caliber range of 20 - 155 millimeters. Mortar and artillery proximity fuzes. Fire control and guided weapons delivery systems for army, air force and navy. Navigational systems, avionics, among other things for the F-16. Missiles. |
| 8. Automobile Parts, T. Torkildsen   |  |
| 9. Gas Turbines, K. Rod              |  |
| 10. Data systems, S. Eider           |  |
| 11. Maritime Systems, J. F. Lohd     |  |
| 12. Oil, S. Rasmussen                |  |
| 13. Engines, E. Armo                 |  |
| 14. Military Technology, J. C. Wirth |  |



for the guidance of weapon stations, the electronic component of the inertial navigation system (in license from Matson), consoles for the flight simulator by Singer, parts of the frame in license from Goodyear, as well as gyroscopes in license from Northrop.

—**QUESTIONER:** Why was it that you happened to select the manufacture of engine components and avionics instruments within the program?


**ANSWER:** On the mechanical side, we had a certain know-how to offer on the gas turbine sector; in avionics it was our know-how from the manufacture of gyroscopes for missiles, which we wanted to expand in inertial navigation. On a long-term basis, we see a chance here to maintain gyro instruments and precision mechanical systems for the Norwegian armed forces. We are also expanding the manufacture of electronics in order to be able to use it for other areas. Thus we are transferring personnel from avionics to the manufacture of fuzes.

—**QUESTIONER:** If the F-16 sales decline now, where do you see a replacement?

**ANSWER:** The F-16 program, to be sure, will be somewhat reduced already during this year, but we will probably manufacture F-16 components still throughout the [year]. Some additional F-16 orders can be anticipated from European countries. However, we do after all also supply components for the F-16 with in America for the U.S. Air Force. In the engine sector we are hoping for further cooperation with the engine manufacturers, but we realize that we will have to reduce the capacity here somewhat, until the civilian aircraft market and thus also the market for engines will have recovered somewhat. At this point I would like to call attention to the fact that the production of engine components does not belong to the enterprise division Military Technology since 1981 it is an enterprise division of its own. I already mentioned also that we transfer personnel from avionics manufacture to our fuze production; here we have almost completed some new development programs for electronic fuzes in the meantime, which are then likely to take the place of a part of the avionics manufacture.

—**QUESTIONER:** But now really to your own developments. In what sectors are you working?

**ANSWER:** Typical of our program is the mixture of license manufacture—and in license we have already dealt with it—and developments of our own, which are ordered by the Norwegian state in order to fulfill specific demands, when the Norwegian armed forces are unable to purchase suitable material on the world market. We are active in terms of development in three main areas, the fire control and guidance systems, the PENGUIN missile, as well as proximity fuzes for anti-air and land artillery. In this connection, the two largest development programs are the air-to-ship version PENGUIN Mk. 3 and the guidance and command delivery system (GASD) Mk. 1 [medium-scale-integration] -900 for the Norwegian and German submarines. These are at the same time the two largest development contracts which the Norwegian armed forces have ever given away to Norwegian industry with a combined value of approximately 600 million Nkr. As a result the development share in the company division, which on the average amounted to about 10 percent, increased to approximately 20 percent. Thus we can employ about 20 percent of our personnel for development.



1. Navigation system
2. Guidance and information system
3. Air surveillance and weapon control system

**WEDERTECHNIK:** For how long have you been active in the sphere of fire control systems or, more broadly expressed, guidance and weapon delivery systems?

**Width:** The first Norwegian development probably was the TERNE anti-submarine system, which was developed by the Norwegian Institute for Defense Research. This system, which was developed at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, was a ballistic missile, which penetrates deep into the sea and there as a mine with an acoustic proximity fuze is supposed to destroy submarines. As in the case of many projects, in the case of fire control systems, too, we cooperate very closely with this Norwegian Institute for Defense Research, which is especially in the preliminary development, frequently all the way to the development of prototypes. Thus the digital artillery fire control computer, too, was developed in our Institute for Defense Research--the industrialization and manufacture, however, took place in our firm. This ODIN-Computer is the basis for the entire civilian and military data technology in the Kongsberg firm. For the civilian market we then later developed and manufactured a new generation of computers, a part of these was militarized and introduced in military systems. The Norwegian Air Force introduced this ODIN Computer at the beginning of the 1970's, complete with data input and output devices and data transmission units from us. Since the army now has an additional need, we are hoping for a further production commission, but then want to utilize a more modern, but compatible computer.

QUESTION: And when did you take the step in the direction of ship systems?

ANSWER: Here the beginning actually was a license production of the USA fire control system M-26 for the Norwegian gunboats and frigates in the 1960's. This activity and the artillery computers led to the development of the multi-sensor integration system MSI-70U for the retrofitting of the 15 submarines of the Lupo-class built in Germany. The Norwegian navy is very satisfied with this system, which was developed at the beginning of the 1970's. MSI-70U is employed for target tracking, torpedo guidance, and situation display and, in addition to the computer, also encompasses a console with two screens developed by us.

QUESTION: Was it not this system which was the basis for an offer to the British navy for combat effectiveness upgrading of the submarines of the 206-class?

ANSWER: Yes, in November 1977 the BWB [Federal Office for Military Technology and Procurement] requested an offer for a torpedo weapon delivery system on the basis of the MSI-70U [medium-scale-integration-70U] for the submarines of the 206-class, which then however did not materialize. The next system then was the MS-80 [medium-scale-integration-80], a guidance and weapon delivery system for the new Norwegian fast patrol boats. It controls the use of missiles, mines, and torpedoes, a simple navigation radar and electro-optical sensors and sonars, and through LINK it is connected with other units. Here, too, we developed the control console ourselves, which includes a 23-inch large tactical display and a 12-inch large data display. Thus far we have supplied 10 MS-80 systems for the Norwegian boats, 7 are being used on foreign boats in connection with PENGUIN.

QUESTION: Did you not also develop a command and control and weapon delivery system for the Norwegian coast guard?

ANSWER: Yes, we have in fact the navigation, command and control and weapon delivery system NAVEL, for which we received a development and production contract in 1978. The system has two control consoles: First of all, the MSI-80 console, which we took over from the MSI-80, in addition a console for the surveillance for the control of the 57-millimeter multi-purpose cannon. All components of the system, which has been in use on Norwegian coast guard ships for approximately 2 years, are linked through the databus with the databus of the MS-80 developed by us, that is to say the integrated navigation system with a gyroscope developed in Norway, a command and control information system with surveillance radar and an air surveillance and fire control system with target tracking radar.

QUESTION: Did you develop the databus yourself--do the Americans not already have such a databus?

ANSWER: In addition to the NAVEL it can have other systems as well, e.g., the US Navy's own system for target analysis, which is just free

being installed, and the HUBON by AMC, a bus more for industrial applications. Which also was not designed after the military STANAG 6155. Probably only in Great Britain have these three systems been seriously compared--a comparison which led to the acquisition of two MODUS systems by British Aerospace, to be used in connection with a STANAG modernization project, which in the meantime has been abandoned because of economy measures. Within the foreseeable future, however, we are anticipating further sales to other navies. MODUS is also an integrated component of the command and control and weapon delivery system M1-500, which is being developed by us for the Norwegian submarines of the Z10-class and the German boats of the Z11-class.

WARTHOFFNER: Could you describe the Fuchs Command and control and weapon delivery system M1-500 in greater detail, for this system will meet with great interest in particular among the readers of "Army"?

DEBARDT: The M1-500 builds on the experience which we have gained since 1969 in working with an the submarine approximately 40 manufactured fire control and weapon delivery systems. This, the M1-500 fire control system included, is one of the first systems in the world, the use of which is based on the latest technology. In other words a mathematical model of the submarine is used in order to predict a specific target to the submarine and to determine its position, which contributes to a target determination of accuracy with high quality.

Our development program for a command and control and weapon delivery system is described in the following way: The navy wants to--and must select the systems that are to be used, limiting the number, while the remaining systems (command and control and weapon delivery system) must be coordinated in such a way and be so flexible that it can be adapted in accordance with the construction specifications and operative requirements of the submarine and more. This means essentially a bus-based solution, coordinated with purpose-oriented, and identical computers, with the number of computers and modules determining the performance capability of the system (system). The command and control and weapon delivery system (M1-500) for the two submarine classes is, therefore, a certain realization of a bus-based concept.

W. THOMAS: Two points are being particularly important: The bus must satisfy the NATO specification STANAG 6155 and have such dimensions that it can carry sufficient quantities of data and between the units linked to the bus. One must be able to use individual direct data paths, and this would lead to a large increase in the system, and the search for a system, the realization of which and the installation of which would be quite more difficult.

questionnaire by which is the fuel? (air-and weapon delivery system) will be  
assessed to be fully developed?

10. The first, fully-operational system is to be supplied to the Soviet Union in 1967. We are certain that the allowed time schedule will be observed and that the products delivered will fully meet the demands of the two countries.

QUESTION: And what is the situation with respect to the manipulator and the...?

Additional software development is taking place in the PASTAL project in respect to the computer software, that is to say likewise the efforts we are trying, insofar as possible, to orient it on the international market. For software maintenance a software-maintenance-center is being opened here in Norway on the basis of a German-Norwegian agreement, which was concluded in 1982 by Germany.

10. Following this detailed description of the MSI-90U the additional  
 question is whether there are other, similarly-placed activities in this  
 industry?

For example, we are playing in a subcontractor of Hughes Aircraft Company's European Command Control and Information System, into which we are participating and are manufacturing the consoles in license from the firm. We are taking part in the installation in Norway, and Denmark as well. Moreover, we have appropriated various developments of our own, for instance, we are engaged in the extensive combat effectiveness upgrading of the first control system with FALCON-10 to the Norwegian Air Force. Thus, for the price of one new fire control system, 2 S-129 FALCON-10 could be reequipped, and one would still better performance. We hope to be able to sign an appropriate agreement with the Norwegian Ministry of Defense in the fall. In addition, however, we are also offering other solutions--up to and including a vertical-launch SPARROW.

...and I would like to point out that we were involved in the development of the system and developed two systems. For one thing, the radar director system, that is the rotation mechanism for illuminator radar, and the system

WERNERICH: How well is your missile family PENQUIN. What did you learn with the development of these missiles?

WIDT: At the end of the 1950's/beginning of the 1960's there was a great deal of discussion here in Norway about the equipment of the navy with suitable weapons, and it was concluded that many small boats with missiles would be better suited than only a few large ships. Thus, in 1962 work was begun in the Norwegian Institute for Defense Research in the development of a missile—but it soon turned out that, given the technology of that time, the necessary search heads could not be manufactured. The war in the Middle East, with the active employment by the Israelis, then accelerated the development and subsequent mass production. PENQUIN Mk I was supplied to the Norwegian and the Danish navies. The development of PENQUIN Mk 2 was completed in 1980, so that this version in the meantime could be supplied to the Norwegian, Swedish and Dutch navies and has also been tested in the United States. In the test there, PENQUIN was employed from a small boat, only 65 feet long—the target was a hot air balloon tethered on another boat and a destroyer, which could be sunk by the larger warhead, which we took over from the American BULLBUMP missile.

WERNERICH: How do you perceive the possibility that the American will order PENQUIN and for what tasks?

WIDT: We are rather optimistic, for the Americans have a corresponding need for the equipment of their ship-based LAMPS helicopters, as well as for the equipment of assault shipping landing craft, air cushion vehicles, close range defense of aircraft carriers and centers of the coast guard.

WERNERICH: Would you, in the case of an order, do the supplying, or are you thinking about license manufacture in the States?

WIDT: That probably depends first of all on the number. As license manufacturer, Grumman would possibly be involved, for we have already concluded a marketing agreement with this firm.

WERNERICH: You just now mentioned that PENQUIN 2 is the mass production version. To what extent does this missile differ from PENQUIN 2?

WIDT: PENQUIN 2 partly uses new technologies in the components. The main difference lies in the performance capabilities. The range was increased from 20 to about 30 kilometers, in addition, if necessary, one can also shoot "around the corner" with PENQUIN [2], that means that the missile trajectory during the first flight phase does not lead to the target, only after a certain time does the missile swing toward it.

WERNERICH: How is the missile guided?

WIDT: The target coordinates are fed into PENQUIN through the fire control system which was also developed by us. It then starts and is guided by a mid-course guidance system with an inertial platform and a laser altimeter for altitude maintenance until in the search phase, switched on after a preset time, the target is acquired and homed in on by the very jamming insensitive IR [infrared] search head. The engine is a two-stage motor, during the last



40 kilometers of the maximum range PENGUIN flies, like a glide bomb, without propulsion.

ARMORTECHNIK: Who developed the infrared search head and why did you not choose a radar homing head?

width: The homing head is a Norwegian domestic development, in connection with which here, too, we are cooperating very closely with the Institute for Defense Research. The reason for the selection of an infrared homing head is to be sought in the fact that in the case of the Norwegian coast with many islands a radar homing head could have been used only with difficulty.

ARMORTECHNIK: Is this also the reason for the demand to be able to shoot around the target, that is to have a flight path forming an angle?

width: This is owing less to that than to the sensitivity of an infrared homing head to direct sun radiation. In other words, they must start the missile in such a way that during target approach it does not fly directly against the sun. At the same time one also has more flexibility, through the angle-forming flight path, for attacking a target--and defense becomes more difficult.

ARMORTECHNIK: How then did the demand come about to develop the PENGUIN also into an air to ship missile?

width: The Norwegian air forces developed a large operational study of how aircraft can best be used for the defense of Norway. The result was approximately the following: The aircraft must be used for air defense and secondly for fighting against an invasion by sea in Northern Norway. For this now a stand-off missile with a range of at least 30 kilometers was needed. After a market examination of all available foreign missiles, the conclusion was reached that all of them were not suitable--either they were too heavy and too expensive, or they had a radar homing head, which could lead to problems when the missile is used against a coastal background. Therefore the order to develop PENGUIN Mk 3. The great range of more than 40 kilometers from altitude 10 km is achieved through the enlargement of the sustainer since the booster motor is not needed for use from an aircraft. The wings become a little smaller, moreover there are some changes in the guidance through the utilization of new technologies. As a genuine sea skimmer, Mk 3 is roll-stabilized and has a radar altimeter. The missile can likewise execute the angular shot, but if necessary also turn by up to 180°, whereby the range naturally is reduced.

ARMORTECHNIK: How far along are you with the development of Mk 3?

width: We have completed the development program to the half-way point, so that the missile could be introduced in the second half of the 1980's. The cooperation attempts with an F-16 took place in May in the United States, the first shooting is to take place toward the end of 1984.

ARMORTECHNIK: Does the helicopter version, also offered to the German navy, correspond to the PENGUIN Mk 3?

width: It is essentially an Mk 2, however with collapsible wings. This version we can then also use for coastal defense. In addition, we are planning to install also an Mk 3, equipped with these collapsible wings and a booster, on Norwegian fast patrol boats later on.

WEHRTECHNIK: Mention was already made of your fuze developments. What do you have to offer here?

us entered the development of fuzes beginning in approximately 1960 and took as preliminary developments of the Norwegian Institute for Defense Research. The first development was a fuze for an 81-millimeter mortar, then followed the already mentioned NVT 24 for the 120-millimeter mortar of the federal armed forces. From this we developed an artillery version for 155-millimeter projectiles. New developments are the proximity fuze and impact fuze PPD 323 for mortars and the proximity fuze and impact fuze PPD 440 for artillery ammunition, which with respect to its proximity function is ECM-proof. The fuzes are now entering qualification, and we hope that we will be able to sell them well.

WEHRTECHNIK: The beginning of your firm was in the manufacture of small arms, later artillery weapons were added. To what extent are you still active in this sector?

width: We already mentioned in connection with our ties to Germany that we manufacture the G-3 under license, that we manufactured a 20-millimeter field gun mount and also produced it as a navy pedestal gun mount for the Norwegian navy. Likewise we developed together with Haegglund a 20-millimeter turret mount for the Norwegian M-113. Then we should also mention the elevating systems manufactured by us for the Norwegian M-109 G self-propelled howitzers, including the barrels and breech mechanisms, as well as the 98 K Mauser carbine in the calibers 7.62 and 6.5 millimeter, as well as caliber 2.2. The center of gravity of our activities, however, lies in the other sectors; but we will not give up the manufacture of small arms and artillery weapons entirely.

WEHRTECHNIK: How do you see the future of your firm? Will you continue to remain an enterprise of the military technology industry?

Ovenild: Certain is that we will continue to remain a firm in the defense sphere, but one which is expanding its industrial, that is civilian activities. Industrially the 1980's will be a rather difficult period. However, in recent years we have developed rather good products in military technology, which we want to sell on a larger scale in the coming years. For the first time we now have a foot in the door in the United States. We are cooperating with some European firms--which previously was not the case. Then I am hoping for a reviving good relationship with Germany--the submarine deal should in this connection be the beginning. Our country is located in Europe, and cooperation in Europe is of vital importance for us. Our international orientation is also strengthened by the fact that we are establishing joint firms with other enterprises, such as, for example, with MBB the firm Syscan for cartographic systems. All together we will probably no longer have the business expansion as in the

last 10 years—the markets have become more difficult, the defense expenditures have, and the competition more intense, and many countries are erecting protective barriers—the latter is a great danger for us since we have only a small domestic market.

WHEFFRENIK: How do you perceive the possibility for a new product line in the 1980's in addition to fuzes, guidance systems and missiles?

ØVERLID: I actually see few possibilities, but there will be new products for other purposes, for example in the guidance sector. We are now also already interested in the weapon systems of the 1990's, and we hope for an extensive cooperation between Norway and other European countries.

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Portrait of the Kongsberg Firm in cooperation between the division for product information, Jan E. Andersen director, and the marketing division of the Moench Publishing Group, Harald Helex director.

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July 1978

## FRYDENLUND EXPRESSES SUPPORT FOR SACLANT IN NORTH ATLANTIC

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Lars Hellberg: "Soviet Presence in the North Norwegian/NATO Problem"]

[Text] "The alternative to greater U.S. Navy presence in the North Atlantic region is being negotiated," said Knut Frydenlund (Labor Party), chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee. He did not hide the fact that the growing and unwelcome Soviet presence in this region is a problem for Norway as well as NATO.

The problem was thoroughly discussed during the Defense Committee's meetings with the Supreme Command of the Atlantic Fleet, SACLANT, in Norfolk. Within SACLANT, there is no attempt to hide the fact that, from a military point of view, it would not mind having a flotilla of U.S. aircraft carriers on frequent visits in the Norwegian Sea. In fact, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, suggested that on his recent visit to Norway. From Lehman's point of view, the most important regions militarily are the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean and the Norwegian Sea. Without wanting to place a flotilla of aircraft carriers close to the Soviet mainland, where it would be very vulnerable, Lehman felt the flotilla's main purpose would be to guarantee the alliance control over the Norwegian Sea in a crisis situation.

In Norfolk it was pointed out that there are no current plans to place such a flotilla in this region. On the contrary, there are concerns about the disparity between what might be needed in terms of warships and what would be available in a given situation. With respect to some flotillas, the disparity might be 80 to 20.

That point was further emphasized by General Alfred M. Gray during a very convincing demonstration, which the marine brigade earmarked for Norway gave the Defense Committee at Camp Lejeune: "We can maintain our forces in Lebanon practically forever without any problem of meeting our other commitments. The problem is access to ships, which we depend on to dispatch forces from one place to another."

SACLANT did not want to discuss what might be the negative consequences of the fact that much of the U.S. fleet is spread around the world, in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and, lately, along the coasts of Central America.

"But," according to very high-level sources, "when you have a basket of apples, it is not unimportant that some of the apples are scattered in this manner." Concern is clearly expressed.

Frydenlund sympathized with the concerns of the United States and SACLANC about the buildup of Soviet forces. "It is clear that SACLANC would be interested in a greater U.S. fleet presence in the North Atlantic to avoid shifting present defensive lines, among other things. That is the point of the matter," said Frydenlund.

"How do you view the idea of frequent visits by a U.S. aircraft carrier flotilla in the North Atlantic?"

"We are not interested in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is a deliberate policy of ours that we avoid that. It is equally clear that we want to counteract a Soviet expansion."

"Do you feel that a greater U.S. presence in the North Atlantic region would undermine Norway's low-tension policy?"

"There are problems that must be solved through negotiation. Negotiations are now under way concerning the mutual reduction of nuclear missiles. To be sure, these negotiations are limited to Central Europe, but if a solution can be reached there, it would be important to reach similar solutions with respect to the adjacent areas. It would be anomalous if a solution in Vienna would not at least have an indirect effect on the adjacent areas, possibly through new negotiations as a follow-up to a possible agreement with respect to Central Europe," said Frydenlund.

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## SOVIET SUBMARINE APPEARS IN MIDST OF LARGE NAVAL EXERCISE

Oslo VERDENS GANG in Norwegian 15 Sep 83 p 9

[Article by Morten Aasbo: "Submarine Chase Suppressed"]

[Text] For nearly 4 days and nights last week, the Norwegian Navy was secretly chasing a foreign submarine north of Hammarøy in Vestfjord. In the midst of a large naval exercise, three navy officers sighted the top of a submarine conning tower last Tuesday. According to what VERDENS GANG has learned, the fruitless chase was to be kept secret.

At least half of Norway's naval units were gathered in Vestfjord for the gigantic exercise, FLOTEX 83, when three of the officers aboard the Norwegian submarine "Stord" sighted the foreign submarine through a telescope. The sighting was made well inside Norwegian territorial limits.

The three "Stord" officers--including the captain--sighted parts of the submarine tower and "masts" through a telescope from a distance of 3 kilometers. Some 30 seconds later, the submarine disappeared from the surface.

#### The Chase

Immediately following the sighting, at about 14:30 Norwegian time last Tuesday, several frigates and corvettes were engaged in the chase together with the two submarines that took part in the FLOTEX 83 exercise. An Orion aircraft was also requested from Andoya air force base following the sighting. An intensive air and sea sonar search throughout the evening and night yielded no results. The chase slackened off somewhat on Wednesday, but continued until Friday, when FLOTEX 83 was concluded as planned.

Press and information officer Jan Aasto with the North Norway Defense Command classified the sighting as a "Possible submarine."

#### Confirmed

Defense Minister Anders C. Sjaastad confirmed the reported sighting of something that might have been a foreign submarine during the FLOTEX exercise. He firmly denied that the military had attempted to suppress the sighting in Vestfjord.



"We began an intensive search immediately after the sighting, but were unable to find anything to support it," said Sjaastad.

Embarrassing?

The FLOTEX exercise in Vestfjord from Monday to Friday last week included more than half of Norway's naval units concentrated in a relatively small area north of Hammaroy in Vestfjord.

Nevertheless, a foreign submarine took the chance of positioning itself, partly surfaced, only 3 kilometers from the exercise area.

Although an extensive search was undertaken immediately, the chase was concluded without making sonar contact.

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## STARTING DEFENSE COMMITTEE CONFRONTED WITH PILOT SHORTAGES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Sep 83 p 5

[Article by Lars Hellberg: "Shortage of Pilots--Why Buy Planes?"]

[Text] The parliamentary Defense Committee was severely criticized when it met with Norwegian pilot instructors and students at the Sheppard Air Force Base in Texas last Wednesday. The committee had arrived in Texas following a meeting with General Dynamics and an offer to purchase 24 more F-16s, only to be confronted with the fact that the air force does not have enough pilots right now to man 20 of the nearly 60 F-16s already purchased. Altogether, the contract involves 72 planes.

It was almost accidental that the Defense Committee was criticized at this crossroad. Civilian airlines were recruiting pilots again in the presence of the Defense Commitee. Consequently, it became the target of all the built-up criticism of political authorities over a number of years.

But discussions at the NATO training center left no doubt that something drastic must be done to stop the loss of pilots to civilian aviation.

"Why buy new planes when we cannot man what we already have?" it was asked.

It also remains an open question whether there is enough money in the defense budget to purchase more planes. If so, we are talking about six new planes, both in 1991 and in 1992, with the option to buy another 12 later. General Dynamics wants an answer by the end of this year already.

Fighter pilots hardly have reason to complain about the pay while they remain in active military service. The problem arises when they complete the required military duty and can anticipate a considerable reduction in pay in jobs of higher classifications but without the flying supplement.

Another aspect of the problem concerns security. It is the experienced pilot, having completed the required military duty, who leaves the airforce to get into a more lucrative position. "Over and over again, we have heard that something must be done about this problem, but nothing ever is," was the comment.

The committee listened politely and acknowledged the problem, but would not promise anything. Bjorn Erling Ytterhorn, Progressive Party representative, was the exception. On the spur of the moment, he proposed a reduction in the number of Norwegian students to the pilot training center, using the savings to improve conditions for those who remain in military service.

Others pointed out that the problems faced by persons with special qualifications, like fighter pilots, must be dealt with in a broader context. Ships' captains and officers in similarly susceptible jobs have the same complaints.

"In a broader context, it is rather a problem of finding a balance relative to civilian aviation than of preventing pilots from leaving the air force," it was said.

According to critics, Denmark has solved its problems in this area by raising the pay by 4,000 kroner a month. But most of them pointed out that the pay is only part of the problem. To a great extent, the dissatisfaction centers around the assignment system, housing conditions, etc., etc.

The lack of balance between conditions for military and civilian pilots could soon create much bigger problems than what we have seen so far. Should all those who will complete their required military duty next year say good-bye, the air force will have a shortage of 50 qualified fighter pilots.

"The skirmish" at the joint NATO training center in Texas did not solve any problems, but the committee was clearly told what the situation is. Furthermore, there were signs of agreement on an important point, namely to investigate the possibility of allowing civilian pilots with fighter experience to serve in the air force part-time, even after they leave the service.

The United States, Sweden and Switzerland are among the countries that have such a system. "The lack of such opportunities is a principal weakness in our military preparedness. We who leave the air force would prefer a reliable defense. I would like to make a contribution to that effect although I have a civilian job," was the statement of one of the critics. That was a poignant point as far as the Defense Committee was concerned.

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## BRIEFS

ARGUMENT FOR MORE F-16'S--Bad luck with the F-5 fighter plane is now being used as an argument for replacing it with the modern F-16, also as far as the 338 squadron at Orland air force base is concerned. This was confirmed by statements made to ADRESSEAVISEN and Norwegian RADIO (NRK) Trondelag after a pilot on a training mission from Banak air force base in Finnmark developed problems last Monday when the control stick become locked. The pilot was able to maneuver the plane despite the technical failure and was gradually able to unlock the control stick so that he could land at Banak air force base in good condition. On Monday, military leaders denied that the failure had anything to do with the age of the Freedom Fighters and that this was an argument for replacing them with F-16s. Defense Chief Sven Hauge told NRK-Trondelag that it is not the plane's age but its technical condition which is important to our security. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 83 p 56] 8952

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## NATO UNIT'S BARCELONA COURTESY CALL SPARKS REACTION

Barcelona AVUI in Catalan 20 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by B.N.]

[Text] Barcelona--A NATO naval grouping composed of 5 vessels is paying a courtesy call to Barcelona. It is composed of naval units from the fleets of Greece, Great Britain, Italy, the United States and Turkey. The five vessels will be in our city until the 22nd.

This naval force began its activities last 7 September in Taranto and has performed a series of maneuvers around the Mediterranean under the command of ship's Captain Diomidis Bekiaris. It is an on-call squadron and in the course of the maneuvers will visit four Mediterranean ports. The naval force will be broken up in Catalonia on 10 October.

Before calling at the port of Barcelona, the naval units made a technical stopover at the city of Mallorca. In the port of the city of Mallorca, some incidents occurred on account of people protesting against the presence of the vessels on the island. In Barcelona it will be hard for the disturbances to be repeated because the vessels are anchored at the southern dock or inner harbor, at the Prince of Spain pier, far from the central harbor area.

## Good Public Relations

Yesterday a press conference was called on board the "Apostolis," the flagship of the fleet. After a tour of the port facilities, one comes to where the Apostolis is moored and the sentence "I am a journalist" opens the gates of the ship to us. The sailor who receives us at the end of the gangway leads us towards a room. "Then I was called by an official organization telling me to make sure to treat those people right," says one of those attending the conference. The room is warm and friendly, and the moquette, the wall, and the cloths that cover a long table are different tones of green. The commanders of the ships arrive, as well as the commodore of the naval force, Captain Diomidis Bekiaris. Admiral Giuseppe de Giovanni, commander of the allive naval forces of the southern sector, is responsible for translation.

We are handed a broad, exhaustive press file, and the military commanders, dressed in dazzling white, began explaining the reasons for their visit. "Throughout the year we carry out two maneuvers, one in the spring and the other in the month of September." They are tactical exercises which are held in a secret place and combined with courtesy visits. They explain to us that the exercises are for the purpose of "training in modern naval warfare under the multiple aspects of naval maneuvers."

During the course of the interview, everything is friendliness and cordiality. An attempt is made to project a good image to the press with an accurate control of public relations.

#### Avoidance of Controversial Issues

This NATO squadron is composed of submarine-chaser frigates and is now performing its 27th maneuvers. There are five vessels from different countries with different materiel. "Each country is to contribute what it has," replies one of the naval men. The talk continues and the questions come one after the other. The hard questions are not answered and the admiral weathers the storm by saying to his table companions: "Let Mr... answer if he wants to." And the questions referring to the integration of Spain into NATO and what it would involve, were not answered.

After the press conference they take the customary pictures of us on the deck of the ships. On the pier the sailors from one of the ships, the English "Arethusa," play rugby and play it almost perfectly. They run up and down in groups of three and pass each other the ball. They seek diversion on a day of rest and use it to loosen up their muscles. A motor coach arrives with other sailors who have had the luck to go to Barcelona to enjoy the attractions of the city. The rest goes on in a corner of the southern dock or inner harbor, far from any urban settlement, while their commanders engage in public relations.

#### "It's Dangerous to Belong to NATO"

Among all the political forces consulted, only ERC [Republican Left of Catalonia] wished to go on record with their opinion on the subject. "The visit of the NATO vessels to Barcelona confirms once more the bonds that have been established between Spain and the organization in question and the PSOE's calling to belong to a militaristic bloc, a decision with which we do not agree. The business of full membership in NATO is a bit dangerous. The Republican Left of Catalonia would like us to be able to get out of this affair," stated Albert Alay, spokesman of ERC.

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